Jewish Defense Organizations:
Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi)
Jewish Defense: Table of Contents | Palmach | Irgun (Etzel)
An acronym for Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), Lehi was an underground organization that operated from 1940 to 1948. At first, it was composed chiefly of a group headed by Avraham ("Yair") Stern, that broke off from Etzel in 1940. The split was due to disagreement on three main issues: (a) the group's demand that the military struggle against the British government be continued irrespective of the war against Nazi Germany; (b) opposition to enlistment in the British army, which Jabotinsky supported; and (c) willingness to collaborate, as a tactical measure, with anyone who supported the struggle against the British in Palestine.
Lehi rejected the authority of the yishuv's elected institutions and the worldwide Zionist movement, and sometimes clashed bitterly with the Haganah.
Lehi's goals were maximalist: conquest and liberation of Eretz Israel; war against the British Empire; complete withdrawal of Britain from Palestine; and establishment of a "Hebrew kingdom from the Euphrates to the Nile." In contrast to the scope of these goals, Lehi's strength was limited; it never had more than a few hundred fighters and its arms stores were meager. The disparity between its aspirations and its real power dictated Lehi's method of fighting: bold, extremist actions, intended both to obtain funding and weapons and to demonstrate that it was possible to strike at the enemy successfully.
As a result of its activities, Lehi found itself isolated in the yishuv. The yishuv's institutions condemned it and the British police hunted its members. On February 12, 1942, Avraham ("Yair") Stern, the leader of Lehi, was captured in a Tel Aviv apartment and murdered by British detectives. The remaining fighters continued to wage his war, and a new command structure was established. Terrorism continued to be the organization's guideline, in the belief that a series of painful attacks would force the British to re-evaluate the wisdom and price of remaining in Palestine.
On November 6, 1944, two Lehi members assassinated Lord Moyne, the British Minister for Middle East Affairs in Cairo. The perpetrators, Eliyahu Beit-Tzuri and Eliyahu Hakim, were caught, tried by a military tribunal, and hanged on March 23, 1945.
When the Hebrew Resistance Movement was founded in November 1945, Lehi joined it, along with the Haganah andEtzel. Lehi carried out several operations as part of the movement, the largest of which was the bombing of the Haifa railroad workshops in June 1946, in which 11 Lehi members were killed. After the Hebrew Resistance Movement broke up following Etzel's bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on July 22, 1946, Lehi continued with its harassment and attrition policy.
In 1947, Lehi decided to concentrate its activities in Jerusalem so as to prevent implementation of the partition plan and internationalization of Jerusalem.
When the IDF was established on May 31, 1948, Lehi was disbanded and its members enlisted in the IDF. Only inJerusalem did Lehi remain an independent organization, arguing that at the time of the proclamation of independence the city's fate had not yet been determined. On September 17, 1948, Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, a UN mediator, was assassinated in Jerusalem, and Lehi members were suspected. The government outlawed the organization's branch in Jerusalem and shut down its publication, Hamivrak. The leaders of Lehi, Natan Yellin-Mor and Mattityahu Shmuelevitz, were sentenced to long jail terms by a military court, but were released in a general amnesty.
Sources: Israeli Foreign Ministry
Jewish Defense Organizations:
The Jewish Resistance Movement
Jewish Defense: Table of Contents | Palmach | Irgun (Etzel)
At the end of World War II, when it became clear that the British government had no intention of altering its Anti-Zionist policy, the yishuv organized the Jewish Resistance Movement, which was run by the Haganah in cooperation with Etzel and Lehi.
The movement carried out its first operation on October 1945, when a Palmach unit attacked the Atlit internment camp and liberated the 208 “illegal” immigrants held there. In November 1945, the Movement showed its strength by launching a major attack on railroads all over the country and sinking several coastal patrol launches. In the following months, the Movement carried out attacks upon British police posts, coast guard stations, radar installations and air-fields.
In June 1946, the Jewish Resistance Movement blew up the bridges linking Palestine with neighboring states. The British authorities reacted to this attack on June 29, 1946 (“Black Saturday”), by arresting the members of the Jewish Agency Executive. Military forces conducted searches for arms caches in the settlements and thousands of people were arrested. The Jewish Agency ordered a halt in the armed operations against the British, but Etzel and Lehi refused to comply. In July 1946, Etzel blew up the central government offices at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. 80 people were killed — government officials and civilians, Britons, Jews and Arabs. After this operation, condemned outright by the Jewish Agency and by the Haganah, the Jewish Resistance Movement ceased to exist.
Pre-State Israel:
Atlit Immigration Camp
Pre-State Israel: Table of Contents | Jewish Immigration | British Mandate
The “illegal” immigration (Ha’apala) to Israel during the British Mandate is a fateful period in the history of the Jewish People and the modern settlement in Israel but also one that links the heritage chain and the stories of heroism of the Jewish people. Coming by every conceivable route, some 122,000 immigrants came to Israel during the Mandate - about 20% of the entire population of Israel prior to independence.
At the end of the 1930's, the British constructed the Atlit detention camp as a military camp on the Mediterranean coast. Between 1939 and 1948, it was converted and served as a detention camp for illegal Jewish immigrants. Many of those imprisoned at Atlit had escaped from Nazi persecution in Europe, but upon arriving on the shores of Israel found themselves incarcerated once again behind barbed wire.
On the night of October 9, 1945, Palmach fighters led by Nachum Sarig broke into the Atlit camp and freed the prisoners in a daring raid. The operation demonstrated valor and resistance by members of the Yishuv in the struggle for the right to immigrate.
Following Israel's independence, the Council for Israel Heritage Sites was allocated much of the camp's original 25 acres and the site was officially proclaimed a National Monument in 1987. The Atlit Detention Camp museum aims to teach the history of this illegal immigration to Israel. It enables the visitor to experience the trauma of the immigrants who were subjected to this form of imprisonment.
The site has a number of restored corrugated barracks, which the British used for processing, servicing and housing of the immigrants. These restored barracks serve to tell the story as the backdrop for a “Sight and Sound” show, interactive computer games and for housing and displaying the Ha'apala archives.
Avraham Stern
(1907 - 1942)
Avraham Stern was born in Poland to a learned Zionist family. He moved to Eretz Yisrael [Palestine] in 1925 and studied briefly at the Gymnasia in Jerusalem before entering the Hebrew University. An outstanding student of the humanities, Stern won a scholarship to study classical languages and literature at the University of Florence. He returned to Eretz Yisrael in 1929 and joined the Haganah, and not long after left his studies to devote his energies entirely to fighting for Jewish independence.
In 1931, a group of Haganah fighters, rejecting what they deemed was moderation and restraint in the fight for Jewish independence, broke away from the Haganah and formed an armed resistance movement of their own, known as the Irgun. Stern, whose views had become much more militant following the Arab riots of 1929, became an active member of the Irgun. He took on the underground name of “Yair,” in tribute to the commander of the zealots at Masada, Eliezer Ben Yair.Stern, who viewed the British, more then the Arabs, as the primary enemy of the Jews and the principal obstacle to Jewish independence, called strongly for an armed struggle against the British. With David Raziel, he compiled a manual on the use of the revolver, the first of its kind in Hebrew. He also wrote the poem “Anonymous Soldiers” (1933) which became the anthem first of the Irgun, and later, of Lehi. A collection of Stern's underground poetry was published posthumously.In 1937, following the Arab riots, the Irgun split, with many of its members returning to the Haganah. Stern and others who refused to accept Haganah leadership remained in the Irgun under the command of Jabotinsky and continued their militant activities. Stern went to Poland to establish Irgun training courses there and to obtain arms. Returning to Eretz Yisrael, he was imprisoned by the British from August, 1939 to June, 1940.Stern insisted that the struggle against the British remain independent of any political linkage, even to Jabotinsky's Revisionist party. He also vehemently opposed tempering the resistance in any way, and thus, in August, 1940, when the Irgun decided to suspend their attacks on the British during World War II, Stern formed a radical splinter opposition group, known as Lehi, an acronym for “Lohamei Herut Yisrael.” He maintained that, even in the face of the Nazi threat, it was the British who posed the major threat to the Jews; doubting the Allies could win the war, he even advocated an alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, believing these ties would assist the nationalist effort in Eretz Yisrael.Stern's extremism, coupled with several robberies committed by members of his group, earned Lehi the resentment of many Jews in Eretz Yisrael, as well as the British. By 1942 the British had offered a reward for Stern's capture. On February 12, 1942, the British discovered and forced their way into Stern's hiding place in Tel Aviv, and killed him immediately. The building is now a museum of the Lehi movement.
Sources: The Pedagogic Center, The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, The Jewish Agency for Israel, (c) 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, Director: Dr. Motti Friedman, Webmaster: Esther Carciente. Photo courtesy of the Jabotinsky Institute, which takes no responsibility for the text.
Jewish Defense Organizations:
The Haganah
Jewish Defense: Table of Contents | Palmach | Irgun (Etzel)
The underground military organization of the yishuv in Eretz Yisrael from 1920 to 1948. The Arab riots in 1920 and 1921 (q.v., see also Tel Hai) strengthened the view that it was impossible to depend upon the British authorities and that the yishuv needed to create an independent defense force completely free of foreign authority. In June 1920, the Haganah was founded.
During the first nine years of its existence, the Haganah was a loose organization of local defense groups in the large towns and in several of the settlements. The Arab riots in 1929 (q.v.) brought about a complete change in the Haganah's status.
- It became a large organization encompassing nearly all the youth and adults in the settlements, as well as several thousand members from each of the cities.
- It initiated a comprehensive training program for its members, ran officers' training courses;
- Established central arms depots into which a continuous stream of light arms flowed from Europe.
- Simultaneously, the basis was laid for the underground production of arms.
During the years of the riots, the Haganah protected the establishment of over 50 new settlements in new area of the country (see Homa Umigdal—Stockade and Watchtower Settlements). As a result of the British government Anti-Zionist policy, expressed in the White Paper of 1939, the Haganah supported illegal immigration and organized demonstrations against the British Anti-Zionist policy.
With the outbreak of World War II, the Haganah was faced with new problems. It headed a movement of volunteers, from which Jewish units were formed for service in the British army (see Jewish Brigade Group). It also cooperated with British intelligence units and sent its personnel out on various commando missions in the Middle East. Another example of this cooperation was the dropping of 32 Jewish parachutists in 1943-44 behind enemy lines in the Balkans, Hungary and Slovakia. Europe (see also Hannah Szenesh, Enzo Sereni, Havivah Reik).
At the same time, the Haganah further strengthened its independent basis during the war. A systematic program of training was instituted for the youth of the country. In 1941, the Haganah's first mobilized regiment, the Palmach came into being. At the end of the war, when it became clear that the British government had no intention of altering its Anti-Zionist policy, the Haganah began an open, organized struggle against British Mandatory rule in the framework of a unified Jewish Resistance Movement, consisting of Haganah, Irgun Zevai Le'umi - Etzel, and Lohamei Herut Yisrael—Lehi.
Haganah branches were established at Jewish D.P. [displaced person] camps in Europe and Haganah members accompanied the “illegal” immigrant boats. In the spring of 1947, David Ben-Gurion took it upon himself to direct the general policy of the Haganah, especially in preparation for impending Arab attack. On May 26 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel decided to transform the Haganah into the regular army of the State, to be called “Zeva Haganah Le-Yisrael”—The Israel Defense Forces.
Sources: The Pedagogic Center, The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, The Jewish Agency for Israel, (c) 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, Director: Dr. Motti Friedman, Webmaster: Esther Carciente
Pre-State Israel:
Arab Riots of the 1920's
by Jacqueline Shields
Pre-State Israel: Table of Contents | Photos of 1929 Riots | 1929 Hebron Massacre
At the end of World War I, discussions commenced on the future of the Middle East, including the disposition of Palestine. On April 19, 1920 (The Faisal Weizmann Agreement of January 1919), the Allies, Britain, France, Italy and Greece, Japan and Belgium, convened in San Remo, Italy to discuss a peace treaty with Turkey. The Allies decided to assign Great Britain the mandate over Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River, and the responsibility for putting the Balfour Declaration into effect. Arab nationalists were unsure how best to react to British authority. The two preeminent Jerusalem clans, the el-Husseinis and the Nashashibis, battled for influence throughout the mandate, as they had for decades before. The former was very anti-British, whereas the latter favored a more conciliatory policy.
One of the el-Husseinis, Haj Amin, who emerged as the leading figure in Palestinian politics during the mandate period, first began to organize small groups of suicide groups, fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”), to terrorize Jews in 1919 in the hope of duplicating the success of Kemal in Turkey and drive the Jews out of Palestine, just as the Turkish nationalists were driving the Greeks from Turkey. The first large Arab riots took place in Jerusalem in the intermediary days of Passover, April 1920. The Jewish community had anticipated the Arab reaction to the Allies’ convention, and was ready to meet it. Jewish affairs in Palestine were then being administered from Jerusalem by the Vaad Hatzirim (Council of Delegates), appointed by the World Zionist Organization (WZO) (which became the Jewish Agency in 1929). The Vaad Hatzirim charged Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky with the task of organizing Jewish self-defense. Jabotinsky was one of the founders of the Jewish battalions, which had served in the British Army during the First World War and had participated in the conquest of Palestine from the Turks. Acting under the auspices of the Vaad Hatzirim, Jabotinsky lead the Haganah(self-defense) organization in Jerusalem, which succeeded in repelling the Arab attack. Six Jews were killed and some 200 injured in Jerusalem in the course of the 1920 riots. In addition, two Americans, Jakov Tucker and Ze’ev Scharff, both WWI veterans, were killed resisting an Arab attack on the Jewish settlementof Tel Hai in March 1920. Had it not been for the preliminary organization of Jewish defense, the number of victims would have undoubtedly been much greater.
After the riots, the British arrested both Arabs and Jews. Among those arrested was Jabotinsky, together with 19 of his associates, on a charge of illegal possession of weapons. Jabotinsky was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with hard labor and deportation from the country after completion of his sentence. When the sentence became known, the Vaad Hatzirim made plans for widespread protests, including mass demonstrations and a national fast. Meanwhile, however, themandate for Palestine had been assigned to Great Britain, and the jubilation of the Yishuv outweighed the desire to protest against the harsh sentence imposed on Jabotinsky and his comrades.
With the arrival in Jerusalem of the first High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, British military government was superseded by a civilian administration. As a gesture toward the civilian population, the High Commissioner proclaimed a general amnesty for both Jews and Arabs who had been involved in the April 1920 riots. Jabotinsky and his comrades were released from prison to an enthusiastic welcome by the Yishuv, but Jabotinsky insisted that the sentence passed against them be revoked entirely, arguing that the defender should not be placed on trial with the aggressor. After months of struggle, the British War Office finally revoked the sentences.
In 1921, Haj Amin el-Husseini began to organize larger scale fedayeen to terrorize Jews. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later Chief Political Officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” In fact, the British encouraged the Arabs to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Waters Taylor, financial adviser to the Military Administration in Palestine 1919-23, met with Haj Amin a few days before Easter, in 1920, and told him “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world...that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine Administration but in Whitehall and if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General Bols [Chief Administrator in Palestine, 1919-20] and General Allenby [Commander of Egyptian Force, 1917-19, then High Commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters-Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”
Haj Amin took the Colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police fromJerusalem, and the Arab mob attacked Jews and looted their shops. Due to Haj Amin’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British arrested him. Yet, despite the arrest, Haj Amin escaped to Jordan, but he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in absentia. A year later, however, British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon Haj Amin and to appoint him Mufti.
Samuel met with Haj Amin on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, however, riots in Jaffa and Petah Tikvah, instigated by the Mufti, left 43 Jews dead. Following these riots England established the Haycraft Commission to evaluate the cause of these riots. The appendix of the report reads, “The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents . . . the Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors, inflicted most of the casualties.”
Following these riots, Haj Amin consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. As the “Palestinian” spokesman, Haj Amin wrote to Colonial Secretary Winston Churchillin 1921, demanding that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration and that Palestine be reunited with Syria andTransjordan. Churchill issued the White Paper of 1922, which tried to allay Arab fears about the Balfour Declaration. The White Paper acknowledged the need for Jewish immigaration to enable the Jewish community to grow, but placed the familiar limit of the country's absorptive capacity on immigration. Although not pleased with Churchill’s diplomatic Paper, the Zionists accepted it; the Arabs, however, rejected it.
Despite the disturbances in 1920-1921, the yishuv continued to develop in relative peace and security. Another wave of riots, however, broke out in 1924 after another wave of pogrom’s sent 67,000 Polish Jewish refugees to Palestine. After a week of skirmishes in Jerusalem between the Haganah and Arab mobs, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs lay dead. The yishuv’s main concern at that time was its financial difficulties; the economic crisis of 1926-1928 led many to believe that the Zionist enterprise would fail due to lack of funds. Zionist leaders attempted to rectify the situation by expanding the Jewish Agency to incorporate non-Zionists who were willing to contribute to the practical settlement of Palestine.
The prospects for renewed financial support for the yishuv upset Arab leaders who feared economic domination by theZionists. Led by Haj Amin al-Husseini once again, rumors of a Jewish plot to seize control of Muslim holy places began to spread. Violence erupted soon after, causing extensive damage. Rioting and looting were rampant throughout Palestine. In Jerusalem, Muslims provoked the violence and tensions by building and praying on or near the holiest place in the world for Jews, the Western Wall. By late August, the Arabs, in well organized formation, attacked Jewish settlements near Jerusalem. The disturbances spread to Hebron and Tsfat, including many settlements in between, and on the Kfar Doromkibbutz in the Gaza Strip. After six days of rioting, the British finally brought in troops to quell the disturbance. Despite the fact that Jews had been living in Gaza and Hebron for centuries, following these riots, the British forced Jews to leave their homes and prohibited Jews from living in the Gaza strip and Hebron in an attempt to appease Arabs and quell violence. By the end of the rioting, 135 Jews (including eight Americans) were killed, with more than 300 wounded.
Like the riots earlier in the decade, afterward the British appointed Sir William Shaw to head an inquiry into the causes of the riots. The Shaw Commission found that the violence occurred due to “racial animosity on the part of the Arabs, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future.” The report claimed that the Arabs feared economic domination by a group who seemed to have, from their perspective, unlimited funding from abroad. The Commission reported that the conflict stemmed from different interpretations of British promises to both Arabs and Jews. The Commission acknowledged the ambiguity of former British statements and recommended that the government clearly define its intentions for Palestine. It also recommended that the issue of further Jewish immigration be more carefully considered to avoid “a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1926.” The issue of land tenure would only be eligible for review if new methods of cultivation stimulated considerable growth of the agricultural sector. The Shaw Commission frustrated Zionists, but the two subsequent reports issued on the future of Palestine were more disturbing. The Hope Simpson report of 1930 painted an unrealistic picture of the economic capacity of the country. It cast doubt on the prospect of industrialization and incorrectly asserted that no more than 20,000 families could be accomodated by the land. The Hope Simpson report was overshadowed, however, by the simultaneous release of the Passfield White Paper, which reflected colonial Secretary Passfield’s deep-seated animus toward Zionism. This report asserted that Britain’s obligations to the Arabs were very weighty and should not be overlooked to satisfy Jewish interests. Many argued that the Passfield Paper overturned the Balfour Declaration, essentialy saying that Britain should not plan to establish a Jewish state. The Passfield Paper greatly upset Jews, and interestingly, also the labor and conservative parties in the British Parliament. The result of this widespread outcry to the Secretary’s report was a letter from British Prime Minister MacDonald to Dr. Chaim Weizmann, reaffirming the commitment to create a Jewish homeland.
The Arabs found rioting to be a very effective political tool becasue the British attitude toward violence against Jews, and their response to the riots, encouraged more outbreaks of violence. In each riot, the British would make little or no effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking the Jews. After each incident, a commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the riot. The conclusions were always the same: the Arabs were afraid of being displaced by Jewish immigrants. To stop the disturbances, the commissions routinely recommended that restrictions be made on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs came to recognize that they could always stop Jewish immigration by staging a riot. Despite the restrictions placed on its growth, the Jewish population increased to more than 160,000 by the 1930s, and the community became solidly entrenched in Palestine. Unfortunately, as the Jewish presence grew stronger, so did the Arab opposition. The riots brought recognition from the international Jewish community to the struggle of the settlers in Palestine, and more than $600,000 was raised for an emergency fund that was used to finance the cost of restoring destroyed or damaged homes, establish schools, and build nurseries.
Sources: Mitchell G. Bard, The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict. 4th Edition. NY: Alpha Books, 2008.
Ahron Bregman, A History of Israel, Palgrave MacMillan; New York, 2002.
The Irgun SiteThe Jewish Agency for Israel and The World Zionist Organization.
Leslie Stein, The Hope Fulfilled: The Rise of Modern Israel. CT: Praeger Publishers; 2003.
Michael Oren. Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007.
Ahron Bregman, A History of Israel, Palgrave MacMillan; New York, 2002.
The Irgun SiteThe Jewish Agency for Israel and The World Zionist Organization.
Leslie Stein, The Hope Fulfilled: The Rise of Modern Israel. CT: Praeger Publishers; 2003.
Michael Oren. Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007.
The Irgun:
Revolt is Proclaimed
(February 1, 1944)
by Prof. Yehuda Lapidot
Irgun: Table of Contents | Background & Overview | Bombing King David Hotel
In 1943, it was already clear that the victory of the Allies was only a question of time. The dimensions of the Holocaust were known in Palestine, but the British government adhered to the White Paper policy, and continued to bar the gates of the country to Jewish immigration. Moreover, those immigrant ships which succeeded in escaping from occupied Europe were not only prohibited from entering Palestine, but were sometimes even forced to return to Europe, although the fate that awaited their passengers was clear to all.
The conduct of the British government further infuriated young Jews in Palestine. The Irgun General Headquarters came to the conclusion that the truce it had proclaimed when war broke out had to be ended, and that it was essential to take action against the British without waiting till the war was over.
In the higher echelons of the Irgun the feeling prevailed that, in order to renew the struggle against the British, it was essential to make far-reaching changes in the leadership. According to Eliyahu Lankin, who was then a senior commander in the Irgun:
We said that we had to find a man to command us who had no connection with what had occurred during and after the split (i.e. the split with Avraham Stern), but it was hard to find such a man in Eretz Israel.
 Menachem Begin |
Menahem Begin, Betar leader in Poland, arrived in Eretz Israel at this point. When war broke out, he had been arrested by the Soviet authorities and sent to a detention camp in Siberia. About a year later he was released under the terms of the Soviet-Polish treaty, which freed all Polish nationals from Soviet jails. He then joined the Polish force established in the Soviet Union (General Anders Army) and reached Eretz Israel with this army. He reported immediately to the Irgun command, but refused to desert from the ranks. Only after being officially discharged was he asked to accept command of the Irgun. Eliyahu Lankin, one of those who approached Begin, remembers that his response was: "Gentlemen, I have been a Betarite and a soldier in the Polish army, but I have no military experience." "We told him," Lankin recalls, "that we did not lack fighters. We needed a leader of authority to blaze our political and ideological path."
In December 1943, Begin was chosen as Commander of the Irgun Zvai Le'umi in Eretz Israel. He established a new General Headquarters, which included Aryeh Ben Eliezer, Eliyahu Lankin and Shlomo Levi-Lev Ami (Levi was the only one who had been a member of the previous command). At its first meeting, the General Headquarters passed two important resolutions: the first - that an armed struggle against the British Mandatory government had to be launched without delay, and the second - that the Irgun had to detach itself from the Revisionist party and determine its own path.
On February 1, 1944, the Irgun plastered posters on the walls of buildings all over the country, proclaiming a revolt against British rule. It stated, among other things:
TO THE HEBREW NATION IN ZION!
THE IRGUN ZVAI LE'UMI IN ERETZ ISRAEL |
When the struggle began, the Irgun stipulated two restricting conditions: avoidance of individual terror as a method and postponement of attacks on military targets until the war ended.
The Beginning
The first target of the Irgun fighters were the immigration offices of the British Mandatory authorities. These offices, more than anything else, symbolized the restriction of immigration and the frustration of efforts to rescue the Jews of Europe. The Immigration Office was careful to grant certificates only according to the quota fixed by the White Paper, i.e. the number of immigrants was not permitted to exceed 1,500 per month. From this tiny number were deducted those Jews who immigrated illegally and were caught by the authorities. According to the White Paper, immigration was to cease completely on March 31, 1944.On Saturday night, February 12, 1944, Irgun fighters attacked immigration offices simultaneously in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. The operation went smoothly and without casualties. Two weeks later, the fighters set out again, this time to blow up the income tax offices, again in the three large towns. An income tax law had been introduced in Eretz Israel in 1941 and, as anticipated, had proven highly unpopular, particularly since most of the burden fell on the Jewish population. One of the reasons for selecting this target was that even those who did not support the Irgun campaign against the British were unlikely to condemn an attempt to prevent the collection of income tax. This operation also proved successful and claimed no casualties.
 British Intelligence office after bombing. |
After the baptism of fire, it was decided to take a more daring step and attack the nerve center of British rule, British Intelligence and the police. Once again the operation was coordinated to take place simultaneously in the three large towns. In Jerusalem, the task was more difficult since the British Intelligence was housed in the Russian Compound, as were the police headquarters and the law courts. Despite the difficulties, the Irgun fighters, under Rahamim Cohen (Gad) succeeded in infiltrating the British Intelligence offices and placing the explosives. However, the duty officer that night, Sergeant Scott, on a routine patrol of inspection noticed a suspicious movement on the balcony. He was injured when fire was opened on him, but before he collapsed he succeeded in shooting one of the Irgun fighters, Asher Benziman (Avshalom). Despite the exchange of fire, the sappers succeeded in preparing the explosive devices and retreating. Several minutes later, there was a loud explosion and the building collapsed. Benziman succeeded in escaping, but died of his wounds shortly afterwards - the first casualty of the revolt. The British officer also died as a result of his injuries.The raid on the British Intelligence headquarters in Jaffa was commanded by Amichai Paglin (Gidi) and the attack on the Haifa British Intelligence was led by Yaakov Hillel. The two raids were carried out successfully.As more operations were undertaken, the fighters gained military experience and they became increasingly daring. On May 17, 1944, some 40 fighters set out to attack and occupy the government broadcasting station at Ramallah in order to make an underground broadcast from there. The takeover was smooth and was carried out without loss of life, but the broadcast itself did not take place because of an unexpected hitch in operating the transmitters. On the other hand, two months later, the blowing up of the district British Intelligence in Jerusalem was carried out without a hitch: on the night of July 13, 1944, an Irgun unit broke into the building in Mamilla Street, detonated explosive devices and retreated without suffering casualties.
The 'Wall' Scheme
One of the operations which undermined the prestige of the British authorities and made them the object of ridicule was the 'Wall' scheme, which concerned prayer arrangements at the Western Wall. In the late nineteen twenties, the Arabs had already begun to complain that blowing the shofar at the Western Wall was an insult toIslam. In 1931, the King's Order in Council (the legislative authority of the Mandatory government) stipulated that the Moslems' ownership rights to the Temple Mount also encompassed the Western Wall area. As a result, Jews were banned from blowing the shofar at the Wall, despite the fact that this ceremony is an integral part of the Rosh Hashana (New Year) and Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) prayer services.
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The ban deeply offended Jews, and the Irgun decided to act. After the imposition of the ban, Irgun and Betar members "smuggled" a shofar into the Western Wall area every Yom Kippur. There a volunteer was waiting to blow the 'Tekia Gedola', the blast which marks the end of the fast. This was not easily done, since large numbers of British policemen were stationed along the routes to the Wall and conducted careful searches of the belongings of the Jews visiting the Wall. The shofar blower was usually arrested and jailed in the Kishleh, the police building in the Old City, which had served as a jail since the Turkish era. (The building is still standing and is now used by the Israeli police). The blowing of the shofar at the Wall at the end of Yom Kippurr was not only a religiously ceremony, but also bolstered national pride throughout the country. On Yom Kippur 5703 (September 1942), Menahem Begin visited the Wall and witnessed the British policemen bursting into the area in search of the Betarite who had blown the shofar.In summer, 1944, the question of the shofar ceremony at the Wall was raised again. This time the Irgun decided not to confine itself to bringing in a single shofar-blower to mark the end of Yom Kippur. Several weeks before the High Holy Days, the Irgun began to issue warnings to the British to keep away from theWall, and announced that any policemen found near the Wall on Yom Kippur would be punished. As the fast-day approached, the warnings were reiterated daily. Nine proclamations were issued in all; the following is the text of one of them:
NOTICE
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The tension mounted. The Irgun created the impression that it intended to concentrate large forces in the Western Wall area, to bar access by violent means. This was, however, a diversionary tactic, and the Irgun had an entirely different plan in mind. As Yom Kippur came to an end, attacks were launched at four police stations throughout the country. These buildings, known as Taggart fortresses, were large structures of reinforced concrete, built in the 1930s according to the design of the British engineer, Sir Charles Taggart. The Irgun's warnings about the Western Wall were examples of psychological warfare, serving to divert attention from the main military operation. Surprisingly enough, the authorities heeded the Irgun's warnings, and not a single British policeman was present in the Wall area on Yom Kippur. The traditional blowing of the shofar after the final prayer took place without interruption, and the congregation then burst into a loud rendering of "Hatikva", the national anthem. No clashes occurred that day at the Wall or en route to it, and the British detectives, who were present in mufti, were disappointed by the absence of Irgun armed forces. They were unaware that the Irgun's fighting units were at that very moment conducting an operation against the Taggart fortresses in Haifa (under Rahamim Cohen), Kalkiliya (under Nathan-Niko Germant), Gadera - Katra (under Yehoshua Weinstein and Shraga Alis) and Beit Dagan (under Yaakov Sika-Aharoni).
Sources: The Irgun Site
British Palestine Mandate:
British White Papers
Palestine Mandate: Table of Contents | History & Overview | Timeline of British Rule
White Papers - official reports by a British Government commission - were usually issued following government investigative commissions.
Famous White Papers issued during the British Mandate were in 1922, 1930 & 1939.
1922 White Paper
The first official manifesto interpreting the Balfour Declaration, it was issued on June 3, 1922, after the Haycraft Commission of Inquiry published its findings on the Arab riots of 1921. Although the White Paper stated that the Balfour Declaration could not be amended and that the Jews were in Palestine by right, it reduced the area of the Mandate by excluding the area east of the Jordan River, which was given to the Emir Abdullah. This document also established the principle of "economic absorptive capacity" as a factor for determining the immigration quota of Jews to Palestine.1930 "Passfield" White Paper
Issued on October 21, 1930, following the release of the Shaw Commission findings on the cause of the Arab riots of 1929. The document built off the findings of the Hope-Simpson Report which investigated the possibilities for future immigration to Palestine. The paper stated that because of the shortage of arable land, Jewish settlement would be permitted only under stringent government supervision. On February 13, 1931, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald sent a letter to Dr. Weizmann in an attempt to calm tensions by slightly easing these provisions.1939 White Paper
Issued on May 17, 1939, it rejected the Peel Commission's partition plan on the grounds that it was not feasible. The document stated that Palestine would be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab one, but an independent state to be established within ten years. Jewish immigration to Palestine was limited to 75,000 for the first five years, subject to the country's "economic absorptive capacity", and would later be contingent on Arab consent. Stringent restrictions were imposed on land acquisition by Jews. The Jewish Agency for Palestine issued a scathing response to the White Paper, saying the British were denying the Jewish people their rights in "darkest hour of Jewish history.
British Palestine Mandate:
The Peel Commission
(July 1937)
Palestine Mandate: Table of Contents | History & Overview | Timeline of British Rule
At the height of the 1936-39 disturbances, a royal commission of inquiry came to Palestine from London to investigate the roots of the Arab-Jewish conflict and to propose solutions. The commission, headed by Lord Robert Peel, heard a great deal of testimony in Palestine, and in July 1937 issued its recommendations: to abolish the Mandate and partition the country between the two peoples. Only a zone between Jaffa and Jerusalem would remain under the British mandate and international supervision.The Jewish state would include the coastal strip stretching from Mount Carmel to south of Be'er Tuvia, as well as the Jezreel Valley and the Galilee. The Arab state was to include the hill regions, Judea and Samaria, and the Negev. Until the establishment of the two states, the commission recommended, Jews should be prohibited from purchasing land in the area allocated to the Arab state.To overcome demarcation problems, it was proposed that land exchanges be carried out concurrently with the transfer of population from one area to the other. Demarcation of the precise borders of the states was entrusted to a technical partition committee. The Peel Commission did not believe that Jewish immigration was detrimental to the financial well-being of the Arab population and assumed that the issue of Jewish immigration would be resolved within the Jewish state.The British government accepted the recommendations of the Peel Commission regarding the partition of Palestine, and the announcement was endorsed by Parliament in London. Among the Jews, bitter disagreements erupted between supporters and opponents, while the Arabs rejected the proposal and refused to regard it as a solution. The plan was ultimately shelved.
Sources: Israeli Foreign Ministry
British Palestine Mandate:
The Arab Community Under the Mandate
(1922 - 1948)
Palestine Mandate: Table of Contents | Timeline of British Rule | The Yishuv
The British Mandate and the intensification of Jewish settlement in Palestine significantly altered Palestinian leadership structures and transformed the socioeconomic base of Palestinian Arab society. First, British policy in Palestine, as elsewhere in the Middle East, was based on patronage. This policy entailed granting wide powers to a small group of competing traditional elites whose authority would depend upon the British high commissioner. In Palestine, Herbert Samuel granted the most important posts to two competing families, the Husaynis (also seen as Husseinis) and the Nashashibis. Of the two clans, the Husaynis were given the most powerful posts, many of which had no precedent under Ottoman rule. In 1921 Samuel appointed Hajj Amin al Husayni, an ardent anti-Zionist and a major figure behind the April 1920 riots, as mufti (chief Muslim religious jurist) of Jerusalem. In 1922 he augmented Hajj Amin's power by appointing him president of the newly constituted Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), which was given wide powers over the disbursement of funds from religious endowments, fees, and the like.
By heading the SMC, Hajj Amin controlled a vast patronage network, giving him power over a large constituency. This new patronage system competed with and threatened the traditional family-clan and Islamic ties that existed under the Ottoman Empire. Traditional Arab elites hailing from other locales, such as Hebron and Haifa, resented the monopoly of power of the British-supported Jerusalem-based elite. Furthermore, as an agricultural depression pushed many Arabs westward into the coastal cities, a new urban-based elite emerged that challenged the Nashashibis and Husaynis.
Tension between members of Arab elites was exacerbated because Hajj Amin, who was not an elected official, increasingly attempted to dictate Palestinian politics. The competition between the major families and the increased use of the Zionist threat as a political tool in interelite struggles placed a premium on extremism. Hajj Amin frequently incited his followers against the Nashashibis by referring to the latter as Zionist collaborators. As a result, Palestinian leadership during the Mandate was fragmented and unable to develop a coherent policy to deal with the growing Zionist movement.
The other major transformation in Palestinian Arab society during the Mandate concerned the issue of land ownership. During the years of Ottoman rule, the question of private property rights was never fully articulated. The tenuous nature of private property rights enabled the Zionist movement to acquire large tracts of land that had been Arab owned. The sale of land to Jewish settlers, which occurred even during the most intense phases of the Palestinian Revolt, reflected the lack of national cohesion and institutional structure that might have enabled the Palestinian Arabs to withstand the lure of quick profits. Instead, when increased Jewish land purchases caused property prices to spiral, both the Arab landowning class and absentee landlords, many of whom resided outside Palestine, were quick to sell for unprecedented profits. In the 1930s, when Palestine was beset by a severe economic depression, large numbers of Arab peasants, unable to pay either their Arab landlords or taxes to the government, sold their land. The British did not intervene in the land purchases mainly because they needed the influx of Jewish capital to pay for Jewish social services and to maintain the Jewish economy.
Sources: Library of Congress
The Holocaust:
The Mufti and the Führer
(November 1941)
Holocaust: Table of Contents | Concentration Camps | Jewish Persecution
In 1941, Haj Amin al-Husseini fled to Germany and met with Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti-Jewish program to the Arab world.
The Mufti sent Hitler 15 drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. Furthermore, “they accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries, in accordance with the interest of the Arabs and, by the same method, that the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”1In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti's requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs, however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches....The Arabs were Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely....the Jews....” Hitler replied:Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine....Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle....Germany's objective [is]...solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere....In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. The Mufti thanked Hitler profusely.2In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting 20,000 Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped from French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut. He died in 1974.Read more about the conversation between Hitler and the Mufti, CLICK HERE.
Sources:
1 “Grand Mufti Plotted To Do Away With All Jews In Mideast,” Response, (Fall 1991), pp. 2-3.
2 Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in the Presence of Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. XIII, London, 1964, p. 881ff in Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin, The Israel-Arab Reader, (NY: Facts on File, 1984), pp. 79-84.
Haj Amin al-Husseini
(1893 - 1974)
Appointed Mufti of Jerusalem by the British in 1921, Haj Amin al-Husseini was the most prominent Arab figure in Palestine during the Mandatory period. Al-Husseini was born in Jerusalem in 1893, and went on to serve in the Ottoman Army during World War I. Anti-British and anti-Jewish, the mufti was the key nationalist figure among Muslims in Palestine. Fearful that increased Jewish immigration to Palestine would damage Arab standing in the area, the mufti engineered the bloody riots against Jewish settlement in 1929 and 1936.
Al-Husseini's appointment as mufti was itself the subject of much controversy. The decision to grant al-Husseini the position was made by Herbert Samuel, the first high commissioner of Palestine. It was odd that Samuel, a British Jew, would appoint a man who would be responsible for so much unrest within the Mandatory area. Al-Husseini in fact had been sentenced to ten years in prison by the British for inciting riots in 1920. None of that sentence was served, as al-Husseini had fled to Transjordan, and was soon after amnestied by Samuel himself.
For his part, al-Husseini had used his influence to quiet additional disturbances in 1921. He assured Samuel that he would continue to maintain order, and it was with this understanding that the high commissioner granted him the position of mufti. In the following year, he was also appointed to lead the Supreme Muslim Council, expanding his already significant powers. Known later as the Grand Mufti, al-Husseini was able to establish himself as the preeminent Arab power in Palestine.
One of the mufti's most successful projects was the restoration of the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa mosque. With funds collected from India and various Arab states, the Dome was plated in gold. The impressive looks of the Dome greatly enhanced the status of Jerusalem in the eyes of Muslims throughout the world. Similarly, al-Husseini's own status as Mufti of Jerusalem increased his standing as an influential Arab leader.
The mufti was dismissed from his position following the riots of 1936. No longer able to stay in Palestine, he continued his extremist activities from abroad. During World War II, the mufti was involved in the mobilization of support for Germany among Muslims. In November 1941 the Mufti met with Hitler. Although he continued to be involved in politics, al-Husseini's influence gradually declined after the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948.
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