Tuesday, June 2, 2015
British reports on Hassan Salameh, an Arab terrorist leader killed in the War of Independence
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| Hassan Salameh (indicated by the arrow). Published in the Egyptian magazine "Al Musawar" on 12.1.1948 with the caption "The hero Hassan Salameh; Commander of the Southern front" (Wikipedia) |
On June 2, 1948, Hassan Salameh, the commander of a Palestinian military organization in the Lydda and Ramle area, died of his wounds suffered while leading an attack on May 31 against members of the IZL (Irgun Tsvai Leumi orIrgun, the right wing Jewish resistance movement that fought the British Mandate government) who were holding the settlement of Rosh Ha'ayin. Today, 67 years after his death, the Israel State Archives is publishing some documents of the British Criminal Investigation Department (CID) concerning Hassan Salameh (File P 3056/56 in the Archives).
According to the CID documents, Salameh was born in the village of Qula in the Lydda district (not far from the city of Modi'in today) sometime between 1910 and 1912 (the exact year is not clear). From 1937 on, he participated in terror attacks during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 against British rule. Among his actions was an attack on a train near Ramle on October 14 1937, and he was wounded during the attack. After the failure of the revolt, Salameh escaped from Palestine and arrived in Rome after the beginning of the Second World War, while staying in contact with the leader of the revolt, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (who arrived in Berlin after the failure of the Iraqi pro-Axis insurrection in 1941). On October 1944, German Intelligence parachuted a team of saboteurs composed of German and Arab agents near Jericho, in an operation code named ATLAS. The saboteurs planned, among other missions, to poison the springs in Rosh Ha'ayin, which delivered water to Tel Aviv. Part of the team was caught in a large manhunt conducted by the British security forces (led by the commander of the Jericho police, Faiz Bey al-Idrissi, the highest ranking Arab officer in the Palestine Police) but two managed to run away – Salameh and a German, originally from the German Templar community in Palestine named Deiniger. In the British CID files we find two documents regarding the affair: The first from October 31, 1944 and the second dated November 3, 1944.
According to the CID documents, Salameh was born in the village of Qula in the Lydda district (not far from the city of Modi'in today) sometime between 1910 and 1912 (the exact year is not clear). From 1937 on, he participated in terror attacks during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 against British rule. Among his actions was an attack on a train near Ramle on October 14 1937, and he was wounded during the attack. After the failure of the revolt, Salameh escaped from Palestine and arrived in Rome after the beginning of the Second World War, while staying in contact with the leader of the revolt, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (who arrived in Berlin after the failure of the Iraqi pro-Axis insurrection in 1941). On October 1944, German Intelligence parachuted a team of saboteurs composed of German and Arab agents near Jericho, in an operation code named ATLAS. The saboteurs planned, among other missions, to poison the springs in Rosh Ha'ayin, which delivered water to Tel Aviv. Part of the team was caught in a large manhunt conducted by the British security forces (led by the commander of the Jericho police, Faiz Bey al-Idrissi, the highest ranking Arab officer in the Palestine Police) but two managed to run away – Salameh and a German, originally from the German Templar community in Palestine named Deiniger. In the British CID files we find two documents regarding the affair: The first from October 31, 1944 and the second dated November 3, 1944.
Three weeks after fighting between Jews and Arabs broke out in Palestine which eventually led to the war of Independence, on December 22 1947, the superintendent of police in the Lydda district was asked by the district commissioner for information on Salameh, described as "one of the two most active trouble-makers in the country at present" (he doesn’t mention who the other "trouble-maker" is). The CID replied on December 30, sending a full brief on Salameh and an attached letter. One of the interesting facts arising from the brief (paragraph 8) is that in 1939, after escaping to Syria, Salameh offered his services to the British whom he had been fighting , but they declined his offer.
Salameh's son, Ali Hassan Salameh (1940-1979) joined the FATAH organization and during the 1970s led the "Black September" organization, which conducted a series of murderous terror attacks against Israel. The most notorious of the operations was the attack and murder of the Israeli sportsmen in the Munich Olympics in September 1972. In January 1979, Ali Hassan Salameh was assassinated in Beirut.
Salameh's son, Ali Hassan Salameh (1940-1979) joined the FATAH organization and during the 1970s led the "Black September" organization, which conducted a series of murderous terror attacks against Israel. The most notorious of the operations was the attack and murder of the Israeli sportsmen in the Munich Olympics in September 1972. In January 1979, Ali Hassan Salameh was assassinated in Beirut.
Thursday, May 7, 2015
The End of World War II in Europe: Wartime Letters from Chaim Herzog to Family and Friends
This May we mark the 70th anniversary of the surrender of Nazi Germany and the end of the Second World War in Europe. Last year we published a post on a letter sent in May 1945 by Israel's future president, Lieutenant Chaim (Vivian) Herzog, to his parents, while serving as an intelligence officer in the British army. Here we bring you more of Herzog's wartime letters in English which were collected for the commemorative volume issued by the Archives.
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| Chaim Herzog and his brother Yaakov with their father in Germany, June 1946 Israel State Archives |
In the summer of 1938 Herzog, born in Belfast when his father, Rabbi Isaac (Yitzhak) Herzog, was serving as chief rabbi of Ireland, went to England to study law. When World War II broke out in 1939 he was not conscripted, but after qualifying as a barrister in 1942 he joined the British Army. You can read the letter he sent to his parents and brother Yaacov here. He signed it "Vivian", the name by which he was known in the Army, as Chaim was hard to pronounce.
In June 1944 the allied armies invaded Normandy. Herzog too was sent to France and searched for members of his family who had managed to survive the Holocaust. He wrote to his parents about a visit to them in Paris in November 1944and about his attempts to obtain news of his cousin Annette Goldberg, who died in Auschwitz. In December 1944 he took part in the Allied invasion of Germany and in April 1945 he wrote to his parents from Brussels about celebrating – or rather not celebrating – the Pesach holiday in occupied Germany. Soon afterwards Herzog wrote to his family on "the morning of the first day of peace in Europe" (May 8) after the surrender of the German forces in the Weser-Elbe peninsula.
After the German surrender Herzog joined the British military government, and on 1 January 1946 he wrote to his old friend Yehoshua (Justus) Justman that he had managed to find Justman's relative Ruth, who had survived. In another letter from September 1946 he described celebrating the New Year in the Belsen D.P. campwhich had now become the centre of Jewish life in the British occupied zone. He complained that the German style rabbi sent over from England had failed to rise to the occasion - "Rosh Hashanah before Musaph in a shattered community", and gave a dry sermon, adding in Yiddish "A German [Jew] remains a German."
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| Chaim Herzog and his mother, Rabbanit Sarah Herzog, in Palestine, 1945 Photograph: David Eldan, Government Press Office Collection |
Chaim Herzog reached the rank of major, and the experience and knowledge acquired during his service helped him when he became the head of intelligence in the new Israeli army in 1948, and served again in the post in 1959-1961.
Tuesday, June 18, 2013
A Girl in a Photograph - More Than 90 Years Ago
The Israel Defense Forces and Defense Establishment Archives (IDFA) has published on its website a series of photographs related to the reopening of the railway station in Jerusalem. The station has recently been converted to arecreation, culture and food area--a welcome addition to Jerusalem.
The picture shows a girl on his right, and she is interesting in her own right. In the book "Looking Twice at the Land of Israel" (published by the Defense Ministry and Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, 1991), Benjamin Z. Kedar identifies her as Falkenhayn's daughter, Erica. Erica married Henning von Tresckow, one of the chief conspirators against Hitler in World War II. On July 21, 1944, the day after the failed assassination of Hitler, von Tresckow staged a partisan attack on his headquarters near Bialystok in Poland, and blew himself up with a grenade. He was buried with military honors, but a month later, when the Gestapo discovered his involvement in the plot against Hitler, his body was exhumed and burned in a crematorium of theSachsenhausen concentration camp. His wife - Erica - and daughters were arrested, but later released.
Lots of things happened to her after that sunny afternoon in Jerusalem...
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| Erica von Falkenhayn and Henning von Tresckow (Wikipedia) |
Tuesday, June 2, 2015
British reports on Hassan Salameh, an Arab terrorist leader killed in the War of Independence
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| Hassan Salameh (indicated by the arrow). Published in the Egyptian magazine "Al Musawar" on 12.1.1948 with the caption "The hero Hassan Salameh; Commander of the Southern front" (Wikipedia) |
On June 2, 1948, Hassan Salameh, the commander of a Palestinian military organization in the Lydda and Ramle area, died of his wounds suffered while leading an attack on May 31 against members of the IZL (Irgun Tsvai Leumi orIrgun, the right wing Jewish resistance movement that fought the British Mandate government) who were holding the settlement of Rosh Ha'ayin. Today, 67 years after his death, the Israel State Archives is publishing some documents of the British Criminal Investigation Department (CID) concerning Hassan Salameh (File P 3056/56 in the Archives).
According to the CID documents, Salameh was born in the village of Qula in the Lydda district (not far from the city of Modi'in today) sometime between 1910 and 1912 (the exact year is not clear). From 1937 on, he participated in terror attacks during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 against British rule. Among his actions was an attack on a train near Ramle on October 14 1937, and he was wounded during the attack. After the failure of the revolt, Salameh escaped from Palestine and arrived in Rome after the beginning of the Second World War, while staying in contact with the leader of the revolt, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (who arrived in Berlin after the failure of the Iraqi pro-Axis insurrection in 1941). On October 1944, German Intelligence parachuted a team of saboteurs composed of German and Arab agents near Jericho, in an operation code named ATLAS. The saboteurs planned, among other missions, to poison the springs in Rosh Ha'ayin, which delivered water to Tel Aviv. Part of the team was caught in a large manhunt conducted by the British security forces (led by the commander of the Jericho police, Faiz Bey al-Idrissi, the highest ranking Arab officer in the Palestine Police) but two managed to run away – Salameh and a German, originally from the German Templar community in Palestine named Deiniger. In the British CID files we find two documents regarding the affair: The first from October 31, 1944 and the second dated November 3, 1944.
According to the CID documents, Salameh was born in the village of Qula in the Lydda district (not far from the city of Modi'in today) sometime between 1910 and 1912 (the exact year is not clear). From 1937 on, he participated in terror attacks during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 against British rule. Among his actions was an attack on a train near Ramle on October 14 1937, and he was wounded during the attack. After the failure of the revolt, Salameh escaped from Palestine and arrived in Rome after the beginning of the Second World War, while staying in contact with the leader of the revolt, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (who arrived in Berlin after the failure of the Iraqi pro-Axis insurrection in 1941). On October 1944, German Intelligence parachuted a team of saboteurs composed of German and Arab agents near Jericho, in an operation code named ATLAS. The saboteurs planned, among other missions, to poison the springs in Rosh Ha'ayin, which delivered water to Tel Aviv. Part of the team was caught in a large manhunt conducted by the British security forces (led by the commander of the Jericho police, Faiz Bey al-Idrissi, the highest ranking Arab officer in the Palestine Police) but two managed to run away – Salameh and a German, originally from the German Templar community in Palestine named Deiniger. In the British CID files we find two documents regarding the affair: The first from October 31, 1944 and the second dated November 3, 1944.
Three weeks after fighting between Jews and Arabs broke out in Palestine which eventually led to the war of Independence, on December 22 1947, the superintendent of police in the Lydda district was asked by the district commissioner for information on Salameh, described as "one of the two most active trouble-makers in the country at present" (he doesn’t mention who the other "trouble-maker" is). The CID replied on December 30, sending a full brief on Salameh and an attached letter. One of the interesting facts arising from the brief (paragraph 8) is that in 1939, after escaping to Syria, Salameh offered his services to the British whom he had been fighting , but they declined his offer.
Salameh's son, Ali Hassan Salameh (1940-1979) joined the FATAH organization and during the 1970s led the "Black September" organization, which conducted a series of murderous terror attacks against Israel. The most notorious of the operations was the attack and murder of the Israeli sportsmen in the Munich Olympics in September 1972. In January 1979, Ali Hassan Salameh was assassinated in Beirut.
Salameh's son, Ali Hassan Salameh (1940-1979) joined the FATAH organization and during the 1970s led the "Black September" organization, which conducted a series of murderous terror attacks against Israel. The most notorious of the operations was the attack and murder of the Israeli sportsmen in the Munich Olympics in September 1972. In January 1979, Ali Hassan Salameh was assassinated in Beirut.
Tuesday, August 26, 2014
Operation Betzer: An Operation Against Shirkers and Deserters in Israel's War of Independence
On August 22, 1948, the IDF initiated Operation Betzer (Strength), which took place during the "Second Truce" in Israel's War of Independence (a truce organized by the UN from July 18 – October 15, 1948). The target of the operation was not one of the invading Arab armies, but rather citizens in Tel Aviv, or more accurately: shirkers and deserters.
As it is today, in the ongoing public debate on "carrying the burden" (service in the army vs. avoiding military service), Tel Aviv was regarded as the center of shirking and avoidance of military service. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the head of the manpower branch of Israel's General Staff, Maj. Gen. Elazar Stern, wasquoted as saying "In those [Tel Aviv] houses there is no bereavement, hardly any." The reality is more complex, as usual. But Tel Aviv, being a most central and celebrated city in Israel, attracts more attention, and any display of shirking is intensified and enlarged. (The geography of residence of the fallen in the current military operation, "Protective Edge," shows that casualties in fact came from every part of Israeli society.)
These feelings were far more intensified during the desperate days of the War of Independence. The existence of draft dodgers, while the Yishuv was literally fighting for its life, was regarded as a threat to the cohesion of the Jewish population. In his book, Social Mobilization in the Arab/Israeli War of 1948: On the Israeli Home Front, the Israeli historian Moshe Naor described the background of the unusual military operation, Betzer, which aimed to combat this phenomenon.
The story began in December 1947, when the "Center of the Census for Popular Service" was formed. This institution spelled the end of voluntary enlistment to the different underground movements and the beginning of compulsory enlistment, and the formation of a large conscript army. This center was responsible for the fact that the Yishuv managed to build an army of 100,000 soldiers out of a population of 650,000 in 1948, a force that was augmented with an addition of 15,000 volunteers from MAHAL (Jews from other countries, many WWII veterans from the USA, South Africa, Britain and Canada) and GAHAL (Foreign enlistment – Jews from the displaced camps in Europe and the internment camps in Cyprus).
On August 22, 1948, Operation Betzer commenced. It was executed by troops from the "Kiryati" brigade (then a Haganah brigade, formed from recruits from the Tel Aviv area), soldiers of the military police, the Women's Corps, the Guard Force (a stationary military unit of the Haganah that was responsible for guarding the Jewish villages), navy sailors and volunteers from the civil guard. The Tel Aviv area was put under curfew, roadblocks were erected and all entering and leaving Tel Aviv had to present their papers to the soldiers. All men from the ages 17 – 50 and women in the ages 16 – 35 were called to present themselves at different identification posts, which were spread across Tel Aviv. More than 150 search details scanned the city in search of shirkers and deserters.
2794 citizens were arrested in the operation (1044 men and 1720 women). 652 men and 352 women were sent immediately to mobilization. 189 men and 1365 women had their induction postponed and 203 men and 3 women were arrested as deserters. The operation sparked great criticism in Tel Aviv because it displayed it as a city of draft evaders, and the way the operation was handled reminded many of the British army sweeps during the British Mandate's war against the Jewish underground movements. There was also a claim that using an army for this kind of operation would distance it from the general public. (David Ben Gurion raised this concern, in his war diary in the entry on September 5, 1948.)
Here are some photos of the operation, taken by Benno Rothenberg (learn moreabout him at Haifa University's site):
Aside from these photos, we found the Betzer operation in another place in the archive: inside foreign passports, as part of the Israel State Archives collection of passports, travel documents and identity cards. Inside one of these passports we found the stamp of Operation Betzer.
The Israel State Archives holds a collection of passports, travel documents and identity cards from different countries in the world. The source of this collection may have come from the immigration department of the British mandate in Palestine. The regular procedure to receive citizenship in British-mandated Palestine was relinquishment of one's former citizenship and passport. This procedure held during the first years of the state of Israel until 1951, when this requirement was nullified.
The collection was transferred to the archives from the Ministry of Interior during the 80s. It is only a sample collection and does not include all the passports handed over to the Ministry of Interior. Most of the documents were destroyed by the Ministry of Interior. We also know that many did not hand over their passports when they received Israeli citizenship--and kept them.
We have published in the past a gallery of different passports including the passport of Rudolf Kastner, with the permission of his granddaughter, MK Merav Michaeli.
As it is today, in the ongoing public debate on "carrying the burden" (service in the army vs. avoiding military service), Tel Aviv was regarded as the center of shirking and avoidance of military service. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the head of the manpower branch of Israel's General Staff, Maj. Gen. Elazar Stern, wasquoted as saying "In those [Tel Aviv] houses there is no bereavement, hardly any." The reality is more complex, as usual. But Tel Aviv, being a most central and celebrated city in Israel, attracts more attention, and any display of shirking is intensified and enlarged. (The geography of residence of the fallen in the current military operation, "Protective Edge," shows that casualties in fact came from every part of Israeli society.)
These feelings were far more intensified during the desperate days of the War of Independence. The existence of draft dodgers, while the Yishuv was literally fighting for its life, was regarded as a threat to the cohesion of the Jewish population. In his book, Social Mobilization in the Arab/Israeli War of 1948: On the Israeli Home Front, the Israeli historian Moshe Naor described the background of the unusual military operation, Betzer, which aimed to combat this phenomenon.
The story began in December 1947, when the "Center of the Census for Popular Service" was formed. This institution spelled the end of voluntary enlistment to the different underground movements and the beginning of compulsory enlistment, and the formation of a large conscript army. This center was responsible for the fact that the Yishuv managed to build an army of 100,000 soldiers out of a population of 650,000 in 1948, a force that was augmented with an addition of 15,000 volunteers from MAHAL (Jews from other countries, many WWII veterans from the USA, South Africa, Britain and Canada) and GAHAL (Foreign enlistment – Jews from the displaced camps in Europe and the internment camps in Cyprus).
On August 22, 1948, Operation Betzer commenced. It was executed by troops from the "Kiryati" brigade (then a Haganah brigade, formed from recruits from the Tel Aviv area), soldiers of the military police, the Women's Corps, the Guard Force (a stationary military unit of the Haganah that was responsible for guarding the Jewish villages), navy sailors and volunteers from the civil guard. The Tel Aviv area was put under curfew, roadblocks were erected and all entering and leaving Tel Aviv had to present their papers to the soldiers. All men from the ages 17 – 50 and women in the ages 16 – 35 were called to present themselves at different identification posts, which were spread across Tel Aviv. More than 150 search details scanned the city in search of shirkers and deserters.
2794 citizens were arrested in the operation (1044 men and 1720 women). 652 men and 352 women were sent immediately to mobilization. 189 men and 1365 women had their induction postponed and 203 men and 3 women were arrested as deserters. The operation sparked great criticism in Tel Aviv because it displayed it as a city of draft evaders, and the way the operation was handled reminded many of the British army sweeps during the British Mandate's war against the Jewish underground movements. There was also a claim that using an army for this kind of operation would distance it from the general public. (David Ben Gurion raised this concern, in his war diary in the entry on September 5, 1948.)
Here are some photos of the operation, taken by Benno Rothenberg (learn moreabout him at Haifa University's site):
Aside from these photos, we found the Betzer operation in another place in the archive: inside foreign passports, as part of the Israel State Archives collection of passports, travel documents and identity cards. Inside one of these passports we found the stamp of Operation Betzer.
The Israel State Archives holds a collection of passports, travel documents and identity cards from different countries in the world. The source of this collection may have come from the immigration department of the British mandate in Palestine. The regular procedure to receive citizenship in British-mandated Palestine was relinquishment of one's former citizenship and passport. This procedure held during the first years of the state of Israel until 1951, when this requirement was nullified.
The collection was transferred to the archives from the Ministry of Interior during the 80s. It is only a sample collection and does not include all the passports handed over to the Ministry of Interior. Most of the documents were destroyed by the Ministry of Interior. We also know that many did not hand over their passports when they received Israeli citizenship--and kept them.
We have published in the past a gallery of different passports including the passport of Rudolf Kastner, with the permission of his granddaughter, MK Merav Michaeli.
Thursday, July 17, 2014
The Altalena Affair - 66 years later
66 years ago, on June 22, 1948, one of the most controversial and divisive incidents in Israel's history took place – the Altalena affair. Even today, more than half a century later, the name Altalena still causes controversy and debate.
The Altalena was the name given to a former LST (Landing Ship, Tank) 138 – an American cargo ship used during WWII for landing tanks and other military supplies – purchased by members of the National Military organization (known in Hebrew as the "IZL," an acronym for Irgun Zvai Leumi) in the United States. The ship had a dual purpose – to bring to new immigrants and weapon supplies to newly-born Israel. The ship was named after the pseudonym of Ze'ev Jabotinsky (the founder of the Revisionist Zionist party - the IZL's political mother party).
The IZL planned to send the ship to Israel on May 15, Israel's first day of independence, but was delayed due to the long time it took to purchase the weapons and equipment in France and to load 900 young immigrants (who were trained by IZL instructors). The ship set out to sea at June 11. The ship's IZL commander was Eliahu Lankin and the Captain wasMonroe Fein.
While the ship was en route to Israel, war raged there. On May 15, the armies of Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon invaded Israel, a day after it declared independence. As the battles raged, the provisional government of Israel approved an order establishing the Israel Defense Forces, which included the three Jewish underground movements: TheHagana, the IZL and LEHI (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, known also by its British nickname "the Stern Gang"). On May 31, David Ben Gurion, Israel's prime minister, published an Order of the Day, declaring the formal establishment of the IDF, and on June 1, Yisrael Galili, Ben Gurion's assistant, and Menachem Begin, the IZL commander, signed an agreement amalgamating the latter with the IDF. The agreement specifically forbade the IZL from purchasing weapons independently. The IZL informed the government about the Altalena. However, the agreement was not implemented in Jerusalem, since it was not part of the state of Israel (according to the UN partition plan), and the IZL continued to carry on its own independent operations there.
Here are original photographs taken aboard the Altalena while she was inbound to Israel. The photos show life aboard the ship including drills and weapons training. The photos are part of Zahi Yifhar's photo collection in Israel State Archives.
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| Avraham Stavsky (in white shirt), Eliahu Lankin (left) aboard the Altalena. Stavsky, who was indicted for the assassination of Hain Arlossoroff in 1933 (and was acquitted) was killed aboard the Altalena |
The Altalena left port for Israel on June 11th, the first day of the first cease fire in the war, and Menachem Begin sent a telegram ordering the ship to postpone its departure (in order not to violate the terms of the much needed truce), but the telegram arrived after the Altalena was already at sea. A radio message sent to her was not received. Begin informed the Ministry of Defense of the expected arrival of the ship and negotiated distribution of the weapons. Begin wanted to deliver 20% of the ship's cargo to IZL's battalion in Jerusalem and to keep the rest in storage or distribute them among IZL's units inside the IDF. The government objected to the idea, because it believed it could form an "army within an army" and the Israeli government was attempting to unite all of the factions inside Israel in order to create one united army under one command and government. (5 months after the Altalena affair, the government disbanded the PALMACH headquarters for this same reason). Much of the disagreement between the two sides was based on a great deal of bad blood and complete disbelief in the other side. The IZL and its political origin, the Revisionist party were regarded as "dissenters" and a threat to the Jewish community in Israel, The IZL held very painful memories of the "[Hunting] Season" in which its members were arrested by Hagana operatives, jailed (even tortured) and given over to the British.
The Altalena arrived at the shore of Kfar Vitkin (just north of Netanya) on June 20th and started to unload weapons and the new immigrants. Although the arrival of the ship was approved by the government, Yisrael Galili (who was responsible for the negotiations with the IZL on the ship) reported that the negotiations failed and that he feared that IZL is about to start a mutiny against the government.
The government ordered the IDF to subdue the IZL, and sanctioned the use of force. On June 21st, The Alexandroni brigade encircled the Kfar Vitkin area and its commander passed an ultimatum to Begin to surrender the weapons to the IDF in 10 minutes. The IZL refused the ultimatum and continued to unload the weapons from the ship. Soon a firefight broke out, in which 2 IDF soldiers and 6 IZL men were killed. Begin escaped to the Altalena, and the ship moved south, to the shore of Tel Aviv, with Begin aboard.
The Altalena reaced to the shore of Tel Aviv on the morning of June 22nd(after being pursued by an Israeli Navy ship during the night).On that day, an emergency meeting of the provisional government was convened. Ben Gurion claimed that the Altalena was "an attempt to murder the state…the moment the Army and state surrender to another armed force, we have nothing more to do" (my translation from the protocol of the Provisional government meeting 22.6.48). Rabbi Yehuda Leib Maimon, the minister of religions called for restraint and warned that bloodshed will create an underground but cause an open rebellion [ibid.].
However, events soon escalated and a battle erupted in which the Altalena was hit by artillery shells and started burning. Captain Fein lifted a white flag in order to stop the shooting and allow the crew and the passengers to abandon ship peacefully, but army forces kept on shooting, nevertheless. The ship sank with all its cargo. 200 members of the IZL were arrested but were freed on August 27th (except 5 leaders of the IZL) after public pressure for their release. The IZL ceased being independent and its members joined the IDF and served during the war of Independence.
However, events soon escalated and a battle erupted in which the Altalena was hit by artillery shells and started burning. Captain Fein lifted a white flag in order to stop the shooting and allow the crew and the passengers to abandon ship peacefully, but army forces kept on shooting, nevertheless. The ship sank with all its cargo. 200 members of the IZL were arrested but were freed on August 27th (except 5 leaders of the IZL) after public pressure for their release. The IZL ceased being independent and its members joined the IDF and served during the war of Independence.
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| The Altalena on the Frishman beach in Tel Aviv (Benno Rothenberg collection, Israel State archives) |
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| The Altalena on fire (Benno Rothenberg collection, Israel State archives) |
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| The Altalena on Tel Aviv beach (Benno Rothenberg collection, Israel State archives) |
Begin, who abandoned ship after all the wounded were taken ashore. He managed to escape the army patrols searching for him and broadcasted in the IZL underground radio (my translation)"We knew. The ship is lost. Maybe all the rest is lost. Explosion after Explosion, we were in sea and the shells keep falling around us. All we have achieved is on fire….We will keep on loving the people of Israel and we will continue to fight for the people of Israel…but I will admit: it's the first time that I'm not sure I can convince my men, I will do everything for our people which is in an existential threat…help me convince my men….to convince them that a brother must not raise a hand on a brother…Long live the People of Israel! Long live the Hebrew homeland! Long live the heroes of Israel – soldiers of Israel. Forever" (from Menachem Begin, the Sixth prime minister – selected documents, 1993-1992. Israel state archives)
The Altalena affair was a bone of contention between left and right for many years and a source of personal animosity between Begin and Ben Gurion until the Six day war, when Begin called for bringing Ben Gurion back from retirement to lead a national unity government.
A recent initiative by the Begin Heritage center (and approved by the government) centers on salvaging the hulk of the Altalena (which was towed to sea and sunk after the war of Independence) and placing it as a monument on the Tel Aviv beach. This monument will help heal the wounds of the Altalena affair.
A recent initiative by the Begin Heritage center (and approved by the government) centers on salvaging the hulk of the Altalena (which was towed to sea and sunk after the war of Independence) and placing it as a monument on the Tel Aviv beach. This monument will help heal the wounds of the Altalena affair.
Monday, May 5, 2014
Israel's 66th Independence - Gush Etzion's Last Stand
On the occasion of Israel's 66th Independence Day and in commemoration of the fall of Gush Etzion on May 13, 1948, a day before Israel's declaration of independence, we invite you to re-visit our post from last year on that subject.
Sunday, June 23, 2013
89 New Settlements, and Another 77
There are a few important corners of Israel's state bureaucracy where one can get awesome things done quickly. The invention, development and deployment of the Iron Dome anti-projectile systems, for example, happened very quickly by the standards of any government project. Most of the time, however, executing large projects inside the official sphere is, how to put this, challenging.
All the more reason to observe with incredulity the rate at which Israel in its infancy managed to get things done. Today's document, for example, is a report by Raanan Weitz, head of the Settlement Department in the Jewish Agency, from June 14, 1949. (File ×’-3013/12).
In the first six months of Israel's independence, according to Weitz, 35 settlements were founded. Then, in the ensuing 10 months or so, his department had created 54 settlements, in what was called "Series A". The cost of this activity had been 4,705,100 Lira (IL), and about 11,700 immigrants had been settled.
Just recently his officials had begun settling 1,010 families of new immigrants in 13 abandoned villages. He had "borrowed IL 250,000 for this from the next budget he was about to request, along with IL 171,750 which he had already used for series A, above the original allocation. (And note that he seems to have been informing that he'd already done this, not requesting permission. As in "I've already spent the money, now find a way to cover it.")
Having completed that, he was now requesting funds to launch "Series B". The plan here was to create 77 new settlements, for at least 3,000 families. The cost would be IL 3,676,750 (including the two above sums which had already been spent). The Series B settlements would be made up as follows: 22 settlements of pioneering youth; 22 settlements of demobilised soldiers (many of whom would have been new immigrants); 13 settlements for immigrants in abandoned villages; and 20 founded especially for their immigrant settlers.
The document then goes on for another 30-some pages with details about funds, expenditures, brief descriptions of each of the new settlements, and so on.
It might also be interesting to note that Weitz had no complexes about the abandoned villages. He's quite straightforward in talking about them and naming them, and he also doesn't agonize about how they came to be abandoned. Like everyone else at the time he was aware that the way of the world in the 1940s was that during and after wars populations were transferred from place to place; he remembered how the Arabs had trumpeted their intention to get rid of the Jews, and once the tables had been turned, he was getting on with life; his urgent task was to find somewhere to put the large numbers of Jews who were being transferred out of their homes and coming to Israel.
All the more reason to observe with incredulity the rate at which Israel in its infancy managed to get things done. Today's document, for example, is a report by Raanan Weitz, head of the Settlement Department in the Jewish Agency, from June 14, 1949. (File ×’-3013/12).
In the first six months of Israel's independence, according to Weitz, 35 settlements were founded. Then, in the ensuing 10 months or so, his department had created 54 settlements, in what was called "Series A". The cost of this activity had been 4,705,100 Lira (IL), and about 11,700 immigrants had been settled.
Just recently his officials had begun settling 1,010 families of new immigrants in 13 abandoned villages. He had "borrowed IL 250,000 for this from the next budget he was about to request, along with IL 171,750 which he had already used for series A, above the original allocation. (And note that he seems to have been informing that he'd already done this, not requesting permission. As in "I've already spent the money, now find a way to cover it.")
Having completed that, he was now requesting funds to launch "Series B". The plan here was to create 77 new settlements, for at least 3,000 families. The cost would be IL 3,676,750 (including the two above sums which had already been spent). The Series B settlements would be made up as follows: 22 settlements of pioneering youth; 22 settlements of demobilised soldiers (many of whom would have been new immigrants); 13 settlements for immigrants in abandoned villages; and 20 founded especially for their immigrant settlers.
The document then goes on for another 30-some pages with details about funds, expenditures, brief descriptions of each of the new settlements, and so on.
It might also be interesting to note that Weitz had no complexes about the abandoned villages. He's quite straightforward in talking about them and naming them, and he also doesn't agonize about how they came to be abandoned. Like everyone else at the time he was aware that the way of the world in the 1940s was that during and after wars populations were transferred from place to place; he remembered how the Arabs had trumpeted their intention to get rid of the Jews, and once the tables had been turned, he was getting on with life; his urgent task was to find somewhere to put the large numbers of Jews who were being transferred out of their homes and coming to Israel.
Thursday, May 30, 2013
65 Years Ago This Week: Constituting an Army
65 years ago this week, the Provisional Government debated the founding of Israel's army. On our Hebrew website we've published a collection of documents from that week, and here we'll tell part of the story about the substantial differences of opinion.
The three major documents are the transcript of the cabinet deliberations on May 23, 1948, the discussion on May 26, and of course, the official declaration, published on May 31, 1948. Some of the deliberations focused on the usual: the wording of this paragraph, or the necessity of that section. Most noteworthy of the banal subjects of deliberation was the sanction stipulated for anyone who might not comply and enlist - should the law set a sanction? or should later regulations deal with them? - and it's noteworthy mainly because the exact same discussion is still going on right now, yesterday, today and tomorrow.
The more interesting differences of opinion, however, had to do with the relation between religion and the new state, and the monopoly of power. The religious problem focused on the oath of loyalty stipulated in the decree. The religious ministers preferred there to be a declaration of loyalty, which is secular, and not an oath, which is religious. The secular majority rejected their request and enacted an oath. (Later on, soldiers were given the choice.)
The monopoly of power arose because the IZL and the LEHI were still active, and it wasn't clear if they'd fold into the national army with grace, or with a rumpus. One of the proposals was that the army drop the word defense (Hagana) from its title, so that no-one wold think the IDF was merely a continuation of the pre-state Hagana; if it's only called Israeli Army, went the thesis, the non-Hagana units would find it easier to join. The majority rejected this call, and Israel Defense Forces it is. Later in the meeting (on May 26th) the ministers wondered who enlistees would swear loyalty to: the military command? the State? The government? What wold happen if there was a putsch and soldiers had sworn loyalty to the army? What if there was a putsch and they had sworn loyalty to the government? Quite a chunk of the meeting went on this discussion, which shows that in May 1948 the cabinet was not convinced that Israel would necessarily always be a stable democracy.
The three major documents are the transcript of the cabinet deliberations on May 23, 1948, the discussion on May 26, and of course, the official declaration, published on May 31, 1948. Some of the deliberations focused on the usual: the wording of this paragraph, or the necessity of that section. Most noteworthy of the banal subjects of deliberation was the sanction stipulated for anyone who might not comply and enlist - should the law set a sanction? or should later regulations deal with them? - and it's noteworthy mainly because the exact same discussion is still going on right now, yesterday, today and tomorrow.
The more interesting differences of opinion, however, had to do with the relation between religion and the new state, and the monopoly of power. The religious problem focused on the oath of loyalty stipulated in the decree. The religious ministers preferred there to be a declaration of loyalty, which is secular, and not an oath, which is religious. The secular majority rejected their request and enacted an oath. (Later on, soldiers were given the choice.)
The monopoly of power arose because the IZL and the LEHI were still active, and it wasn't clear if they'd fold into the national army with grace, or with a rumpus. One of the proposals was that the army drop the word defense (Hagana) from its title, so that no-one wold think the IDF was merely a continuation of the pre-state Hagana; if it's only called Israeli Army, went the thesis, the non-Hagana units would find it easier to join. The majority rejected this call, and Israel Defense Forces it is. Later in the meeting (on May 26th) the ministers wondered who enlistees would swear loyalty to: the military command? the State? The government? What wold happen if there was a putsch and soldiers had sworn loyalty to the army? What if there was a putsch and they had sworn loyalty to the government? Quite a chunk of the meeting went on this discussion, which shows that in May 1948 the cabinet was not convinced that Israel would necessarily always be a stable democracy.
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Truman Needs a Note...
The story about how Harry Truman more or less singlehandedly decided that the United States would recognize Israel in May 1948 is well known. The State Department was unanimously against the idea, although at the last moment the Secretary of State did call the President and tell him that since he was determined to do the wrong thing, he, George Marshall, wouldn't oppose him in public. Yet the decision itself wasn't enough. In order for the United States to recognize a new country, someone had to ask them to do so, and no one in Tel Aviv had prepared for that. Clark Clifford, Truman's aide, called Eliyahu Epstein, a Jewish Agency official in Washington, and explained that there had to be an official request. Since neither Clifford nor Epstein knew what such a request might look like, Epstein was on his own. Ben Gurion had declared independence at 4pm Israel time, which was early morning in Washington, and the declaration would go into effect at midnight Israel time, on the first minute of May 15th, so there still were a few hours to figure it out.
Here's the result: A letter from Epstein to Truman, in English of course, in which he informed the president that a Jewish state had been declared, that it was called Israel, that it had a provisional government, and that it was requesting the recognition of the United States. At loss as to his own position, Epstein signed as an "agent of the provisional government".
And here's Truman's response. And notice that someone added the name of the new country, Israel, after the letter had already been typed. Originally it had simply said that the United States recognized a Jewish State.
The full story of the intigues and maneuvers leading to Truman's decision can be found in David McCullough's magesterial Truman
from page 595 onwards, and this particular vignette is on pages 617-18.
Here's the result: A letter from Epstein to Truman, in English of course, in which he informed the president that a Jewish state had been declared, that it was called Israel, that it had a provisional government, and that it was requesting the recognition of the United States. At loss as to his own position, Epstein signed as an "agent of the provisional government".
And here's Truman's response. And notice that someone added the name of the new country, Israel, after the letter had already been typed. Originally it had simply said that the United States recognized a Jewish State.
The full story of the intigues and maneuvers leading to Truman's decision can be found in David McCullough's magesterial Truman
from page 595 onwards, and this particular vignette is on pages 617-18.Monday, April 29, 2013
It's Our Train Company - or: Salaries Will Come Later
Still rummaging around in the special ISA Independence Day publication, here's the story of the first day of a Jewish train company in 2,000 years.
On Sunday, May 16, Moshe Paikowitz came to his office in Haifa. It was his first day of work on the first day of operations at the brand new Israel Train Company, of which he was now in charge. That the train company was up and running on that day was actually a moment of historic significance. Bear in mind that Israel is one of the only countries among dozens and dozens of post-WWII states which managed to remain a democracy throughout its existence, while maintaining a functioning state bureaucracy and society. Figuratively but also practically, the ability to come to work on the first workday after independence and have the trains run, was crucial to this success. Countries which can hit the ground running, will run; the ones which can't, won't.
Perhaps the first thing Paikowitz did that morning was to dictate a proclamation to the workers of the company. It began with high pathos: "It is a great honor for me and for you ... so far we've been employed by a foreign nation; now we're working for our own nation..."
Then he addressed what might have been feelings of inferiority among his staff, given the battles that were being fought in many corners, even as they were being called on merely to run trains: "At this crucial moment, the trains are a small but important cog in the national defense machine. Let each and every one of us regard themselves as soldiers on the field of battle." And also "We must all adhere to orders, be steadfast in our discipline, and remember that we're all in this together!"
Only near the end of his proclamation did he refer to individual motivations: "Of course I never forget that we've always been underpaid and over-worked. I assure you I'll work to convince our government that we deserve better! But first, we must win the war!"
On Sunday, May 16, Moshe Paikowitz came to his office in Haifa. It was his first day of work on the first day of operations at the brand new Israel Train Company, of which he was now in charge. That the train company was up and running on that day was actually a moment of historic significance. Bear in mind that Israel is one of the only countries among dozens and dozens of post-WWII states which managed to remain a democracy throughout its existence, while maintaining a functioning state bureaucracy and society. Figuratively but also practically, the ability to come to work on the first workday after independence and have the trains run, was crucial to this success. Countries which can hit the ground running, will run; the ones which can't, won't.
Perhaps the first thing Paikowitz did that morning was to dictate a proclamation to the workers of the company. It began with high pathos: "It is a great honor for me and for you ... so far we've been employed by a foreign nation; now we're working for our own nation..."
Then he addressed what might have been feelings of inferiority among his staff, given the battles that were being fought in many corners, even as they were being called on merely to run trains: "At this crucial moment, the trains are a small but important cog in the national defense machine. Let each and every one of us regard themselves as soldiers on the field of battle." And also "We must all adhere to orders, be steadfast in our discipline, and remember that we're all in this together!"
Only near the end of his proclamation did he refer to individual motivations: "Of course I never forget that we've always been underpaid and over-worked. I assure you I'll work to convince our government that we deserve better! But first, we must win the war!"
Monday, April 22, 2013
The First Two Weeks of Immigration to Independent Israel
The earliest document in Ben Gurion's "immigration file", ×’-3013.12 (see our previous post), was a report by Haim Barlas, a high official in the Jewish Agency, to Moshe Shapira, the brand new minister of immigration, written in Tel Aviv on May 31, 1948. It summarized the actions of the two weeks since independence.
(Why the Jewish Agency, you ask? Ah, that's a large question. The short answer is that prior to May 15, 1948, there was no State of Israel and also no government of it, so the Jewish Agency filled the main functions of the government-in-preparation. Once there was a state, the relationship between the old institution and the new one was interesting and a bit complicated. In the long run, the state took on the functions of the state, and the Jewish Agency did some things through outsourcing. And mostly, it faded away. As of today, 65 years later, it still does things here and there, and has not yet fully faded away.)
Here's a short English-language version of Barlas' interesting report, which starts with a single sentence of pathos and then gets down to work:
On the day of the declaration of the resurrection of Israel, ships of olim (immigrants) arrived in the ports of Haifa and Tel Aviv and were received as free immigrants without any limitation decrees of foreigners. Three ships with a total of 1040 immigrants. However, the bombing of Tel Aviv by enemy planes, and the prevention of immigration in Haifa by the British who still control the port, means the immigration is now coming in through smaller, unofficial ports such as Acre and Cesarea. [The second century Talmudic scholars would have been tickled by the use of Cesarea, but that's a different story.] During the first two weeks, 4839 immigrants arrived, from Marseilles, Genoa, and the British-run detention camps in Cyprus.
Our orders were to prefer immigrants between the ages of 17-35, but that didn't work out, and we brought in people of all ages. Still, 2150 of the immigrants were of military age, and they were sent straight to the military induction center.
Cyprus: we had a plan to transfer more than 24,000 immigrants who are detained in the camps there. However, various problems slowed the process: the British who still control Haifa [they left only at the end of June], potential attacks on the ships by enemy planes, and the need to register the ships under Israel's flag. We're still working on this; some of the immigrants may yet be brought in by plane, and we've found armed escorts for the ships.
We're creating a ministry of immigration, with an administration, a unit of visas, immigration police, and a consular and citizenship department. There are also offices in Europe: Munich, Salzburg, Rome, London, Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague, Stockholm, Paris, Budapest, Brussels, and also New York. [A list which reflects the aftermath of the Holocaust, of course.]
We're trying to integrate the Jewish Agency immigration officials in Israel into the government system.
Fees have been set for immigrants (1 Pound per immigrant, 20 cents for children, 1 Pound for a visa and also for a travel permit for Israelis).
Measures we urgently need:
1. A law of immigration.
2. Appointments of officials.
3. Adapting the European offices to the new needs.
4. Budget. [Heh.]
5. A plan to integrate the 50,000 immigrants we expect in the next two months. [Is it possible Barlas didn't understand the first two months, and the first 50,000 immigrants, would merely be the tip of the iceberg?]
Sunday, April 21, 2013
Immigrants to Israel, 1948-1952
File ×’-3101/12 contains hundreds of pages of letters, reports and statistics about immigration to Israel between May 15, 1948 and the end of December 1952, as filed by someone in David Ben Gurion's office. Our previous post, about the tragic chaos in the immigrant camps, comes from this file; since it has lots of interesting things in it, we'll return to it in a future post or three. Now, however, we'd like to present the last document in the file, a list which was apparently drawn up in July 1953, summing up the statistics of the immigration.
Bear in mind that in May 1948 when Israel became independent, there were some 600,000 Jews in the country. By the time the battles subsided, towards the end of that year, 110,000 immigrants had arrived, 6,000 Jews had been killed in the war, and the stabilizing borders contained 100,000 Arabs or perhaps a bit more. 800-850,000 people all in all.
By the end of 1952, 738,891 immigrants had arrived (this includes the 110,000 who arrived in the second half of 1948). Of course, the immigration didn't end in December 1952, but that's beyond the scope of our file.
Muslim countries:
Turkey 35,025
Syria and Lebanon 34,608
Iraq 124,226
Yemen and Aden 48,375
Other Asian countries 7,579
Tunesia, Marroco, Algeria 52,584
Lybia 32,129
Egypt 17,114
Total Muslim countries: 377,251 of 889,700
Communist satelite states:
Poland 106,751
Romania 121,537
Bulgaria 37,703
Czechoslovakia 18,815
Hungary 14,519
Yugoslavia 7,757
Total Comunist states: 307,082 of 729,000
Western states:
South Africa 538
Other Africa 576
Germany & Austria 11,013
Other Europe 19,605
Latin America 2,025
Total Western states: 33,706 of 1,746,230
USA & Canada 1,809 of 5,200,000
Unidentified 18,989
Grand total 738,891 of 8,564,930
The USSR is not on the list.
Bear in mind that in May 1948 when Israel became independent, there were some 600,000 Jews in the country. By the time the battles subsided, towards the end of that year, 110,000 immigrants had arrived, 6,000 Jews had been killed in the war, and the stabilizing borders contained 100,000 Arabs or perhaps a bit more. 800-850,000 people all in all.
By the end of 1952, 738,891 immigrants had arrived (this includes the 110,000 who arrived in the second half of 1948). Of course, the immigration didn't end in December 1952, but that's beyond the scope of our file.
Muslim countries:
Turkey 35,025
Syria and Lebanon 34,608
Iraq 124,226
Yemen and Aden 48,375
Other Asian countries 7,579
Tunesia, Marroco, Algeria 52,584
Lybia 32,129
Egypt 17,114
Total Muslim countries: 377,251 of 889,700
Communist satelite states:
Poland 106,751
Romania 121,537
Bulgaria 37,703
Czechoslovakia 18,815
Hungary 14,519
Yugoslavia 7,757
Total Comunist states: 307,082 of 729,000
Western states:
South Africa 538
Other Africa 576
Germany & Austria 11,013
Other Europe 19,605
Latin America 2,025
Total Western states: 33,706 of 1,746,230
USA & Canada 1,809 of 5,200,000
Unidentified 18,989
Grand total 738,891 of 8,564,930
The USSR is not on the list.
Monday, April 15, 2013
4th of Iyar - Gush Etzion's Last Stand
On the 4th of Iyar 5708--May 13, 1948--the day before Israel's declaration of independence, Gush Etzion fell. Gush Etzion, which consisted of the settlementsKfar Etzion, Massu'ot Yitzhak, Ein Tzurim and Revadim, was built between 1943-47. The majority of residents were members of the religious Zionist movement (with the exception of Revadim, which belonged to the secular Ha'shomer Ha'tzair movement). After clashes broke out following the UN partition resolution on November 29, 1947, the residents of the bloc found themselves in a hostile Arab region and under attack from the Arabs of Hebron and Bethlehem. The bloc was of strategic importance of the first order, since it controlled the axis of traffic from south to north towards Jerusalem, and held back large irregular Arab forces, which could otherwise have attacked Jerusalem.
Hagana headquarters in Jerusalem tried to bring supply convoys to the bloc, but this became impossible after the destruction of the "Convoy of the 35" (known by its Hebrew name – the Lamed Hey) in mid-January 1948, and the Nebi Daniel convoyon March 1948, which was attacked on the way back by irregular Arab forces; 14 of its fighters were killed and the rest surrendered their weapons and gear to the British, in exchange for free and safe passage to Jerusalem.
With the intensification of fighting in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Command pressured the Gush Etzion force to prevent movement of Arab forces on the Hebron-Jerusalem road. Fighters from Gush Etzion attacked traffic on the road, including vehicles of the Arab Legion. The Legion, nominally part of the British army, but in fact an independent force under the orders of King Abdullah of Transjordan, started attacking the bloc with heavy fire. Attacks by an irregular Arab force, under the cover of the Legion, were repulsed on April 12 and on May 4. On May 13, a Legion force, along with hundreds of irregular Arab fighters, attacked and conquered the Etzion bloc in a fierce battle. After their surrender, more than a hundred defenders of Kfar Etzion were murdered by irregular Arab fighters. In other settlements, the Legion intervened and prevented further killing. Wounded prisoners were taken to Jerusalem and prisoners were taken to POW camps in Jordan and released after the Armistice agreement with Jordan in April 1949.
Below, we reproduce a handwritten report and a printed English report by the commander of the Jewish Settlement Police in Gush Etzion, Jacob Altman, on the repelling of a large Arab attack on January 14, 1948 (click to enlarge). Altman fell in battle on May 13, 1948, as the deputy commander of Gush Etzion. His children returned to Gush Etzion after the Six Day War and rebuilt Kfar Etzion, where they, and their descendants, live to this day.
Hagana headquarters in Jerusalem tried to bring supply convoys to the bloc, but this became impossible after the destruction of the "Convoy of the 35" (known by its Hebrew name – the Lamed Hey) in mid-January 1948, and the Nebi Daniel convoyon March 1948, which was attacked on the way back by irregular Arab forces; 14 of its fighters were killed and the rest surrendered their weapons and gear to the British, in exchange for free and safe passage to Jerusalem.
With the intensification of fighting in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Command pressured the Gush Etzion force to prevent movement of Arab forces on the Hebron-Jerusalem road. Fighters from Gush Etzion attacked traffic on the road, including vehicles of the Arab Legion. The Legion, nominally part of the British army, but in fact an independent force under the orders of King Abdullah of Transjordan, started attacking the bloc with heavy fire. Attacks by an irregular Arab force, under the cover of the Legion, were repulsed on April 12 and on May 4. On May 13, a Legion force, along with hundreds of irregular Arab fighters, attacked and conquered the Etzion bloc in a fierce battle. After their surrender, more than a hundred defenders of Kfar Etzion were murdered by irregular Arab fighters. In other settlements, the Legion intervened and prevented further killing. Wounded prisoners were taken to Jerusalem and prisoners were taken to POW camps in Jordan and released after the Armistice agreement with Jordan in April 1949.
Below, we reproduce a handwritten report and a printed English report by the commander of the Jewish Settlement Police in Gush Etzion, Jacob Altman, on the repelling of a large Arab attack on January 14, 1948 (click to enlarge). Altman fell in battle on May 13, 1948, as the deputy commander of Gush Etzion. His children returned to Gush Etzion after the Six Day War and rebuilt Kfar Etzion, where they, and their descendants, live to this day.
Thursday, April 11, 2013
"Palestine will be the name of the other state"
A few days before the creation of the State of Israel, a sub-committee of the soon-to-be-government was convened to decide what to call the new country in Arabic, which - it was apparently recognized - was going to be an official language of the new Jewish state. They decided simply to call it Israel also in Arabic, but some of their considerations are instructive. It couldn't be called "Palestine," for example, because that was expected to be the name the Arab state which was to arise alongside Israel would call itself. The name "Zion" was also no good, because it would alienate the Arab citizens in Israel.
Don't believe me? Here's the document.
Don't believe me? Here's the document.
Wednesday, February 6, 2013
The Government Protocols: Mid-september 1948
We continue our series of presenting the protocols of the cabinet (see the previous installment here).
In the week of September 8, 1948, the cabinet convened twice, on the 8th and on the 12th. There were three main topics to be discussed, all of them still relevant in 2013.
The first was the relationship between the State of Israel and its Orthodox citizens, focusing on the conditions of miltary service and how they might be squared with religious commandments. Apparently some Orthodox soldiers near Netanya had been ordered to do something they felt they couldn't do, so they'd been arrested. This prompted one of the religious ministers, Rabbi Fishman, to threaten to resign. The cabinet told him his resignation wouldn't be accepted, and also ordered the soldiers released, as well as set up to figure out how to deal with such matters. A similar committee will undoubtedly be set up as soon as the present coalition negotiations end, and it won't be the last, either.
There was a discussion about the high consumer prices and what to do about them. A committee was set up. (And another will be set up any day now, just wait and see.)
Finally, there was discussion about Israel's position at the UN regarding Jerusalem. It can be summarized thusly: Israel will not relinquish its control of the Western half, and certainly not for some sort of internationalization; if, however, the UN decided that the Old City should be internationalized (Israel didn't control that part), Israel might be willing to go along with the idea. Better that than Jordanian control which would prevent any access to Jews. (As indeed happened.) Without being privy to any insider information, it's safe to bet that this, also, is on the agenda of Israel's present political leaders, all these years later.
In the week of September 8, 1948, the cabinet convened twice, on the 8th and on the 12th. There were three main topics to be discussed, all of them still relevant in 2013.
The first was the relationship between the State of Israel and its Orthodox citizens, focusing on the conditions of miltary service and how they might be squared with religious commandments. Apparently some Orthodox soldiers near Netanya had been ordered to do something they felt they couldn't do, so they'd been arrested. This prompted one of the religious ministers, Rabbi Fishman, to threaten to resign. The cabinet told him his resignation wouldn't be accepted, and also ordered the soldiers released, as well as set up to figure out how to deal with such matters. A similar committee will undoubtedly be set up as soon as the present coalition negotiations end, and it won't be the last, either.
There was a discussion about the high consumer prices and what to do about them. A committee was set up. (And another will be set up any day now, just wait and see.)
Finally, there was discussion about Israel's position at the UN regarding Jerusalem. It can be summarized thusly: Israel will not relinquish its control of the Western half, and certainly not for some sort of internationalization; if, however, the UN decided that the Old City should be internationalized (Israel didn't control that part), Israel might be willing to go along with the idea. Better that than Jordanian control which would prevent any access to Jews. (As indeed happened.) Without being privy to any insider information, it's safe to bet that this, also, is on the agenda of Israel's present political leaders, all these years later.
Thursday, January 31, 2013
The Cabinet Protocols: Late August 1948
OK, our original game plan hasn't quite worked out on this thread. The original intention was to put up a weekly post, following the weekly cabinet meetings from May 1948 onwards, to give a feeling of the pace of work of the cabinet and the subjects it dealt with. For whatever reason, we've not been keeping pace. Still, interested readers are encouraged to follow the posts marked with the "govt protocols" label. Also, keep in mind that these are brief protocols, not wordy stenograms which capture everything said in the meetings.
The protocols of late August and early September 1948 are sparse in information, so today's post presents four meetings of two weeks, between August 25th and September 5th.
August 25, 1948:
The cohort born in 1931 are to be enlisted for military training. A second decision will be necessary before sending them into combat. Special dispensation will be made to allow them to complete their high-school studies and examinations after the war. (We're talking about 17-year-olds).
The President, his wife, and Israel's ambassador to the UN are given Israeli citizenship. (Before the rest of the populace, as the procedures are not yet finalized.)
The peace negotiations with the UN mediator continue.
The Finance Minister (Eliezer Kaplan) gives a presentation about taxes, but no decisions are made.
August 28, 1948:
After what appears to have been a lively discussion and a series of specific votes, the cabinet determined rates of income tax. Unmarried individuals would start paying once their annual income was 240 Pounds, and families would pay if their income was greater than 340. The highest rate would be 75% (!). Corporate tax would be 20%. There would be an emergency tax on fuel. Two separate administrative decisions were made pertaining to the payment of wages of laborers working for the government and of clerks. This seems to reflect an important distinction in the mind of the (mostly socialist) ministers.
The September 1st meeting opened with ministers' queries: Is it true Arab families are being evicted from their homes in Haifa? Is Haifa under military rule? Ben Gurion said not, but Yizhak Grinbaum, the Minister of the Interior, said he'd have go and see for himself. The most puzzling exchange was when Bechor Shitrit asked if Arabs would be able to vote in the approaching elections, and Ben Gurion said this wasn't a legitimate query. (Puzzling because the only possible answer was Yes, according to the Declaration of Independence and also everyone's intentions.)
There was a report about Israel's relations with the United States, and then the cabinet adjourned after deciding that construction of the Burma Road, which broke the Arab blockade of Jerusalem, would be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor and Construction.
September 5, 1948:
Decision: official forms will be in Hebrew and Arabic.
Decision: lots of officials from lots of ministries will participate in meeting of the Board of Agriculture.
On the occasion of the beginning of the school year there appears to have been another lively discussion, at the end of which a series of decisions were made; their thrust was that various strategic decisions regarding how education would be done and its relationship with the government would be postponed until there was an elected government; in the meantime, the government would work with the Jewish Agency (which had been functioning as a government-in-waiting before the creation of the state). Also, the Agudat Yisrael schools would have to choose how their system would relate to the national one. (This issue has yet to be resolved in 2013.)
A ministerial committee of four was set up to allocate empty apartments in Jaffa.
The protocols of late August and early September 1948 are sparse in information, so today's post presents four meetings of two weeks, between August 25th and September 5th.
August 25, 1948:
The cohort born in 1931 are to be enlisted for military training. A second decision will be necessary before sending them into combat. Special dispensation will be made to allow them to complete their high-school studies and examinations after the war. (We're talking about 17-year-olds).
The President, his wife, and Israel's ambassador to the UN are given Israeli citizenship. (Before the rest of the populace, as the procedures are not yet finalized.)
The peace negotiations with the UN mediator continue.
The Finance Minister (Eliezer Kaplan) gives a presentation about taxes, but no decisions are made.
August 28, 1948:
After what appears to have been a lively discussion and a series of specific votes, the cabinet determined rates of income tax. Unmarried individuals would start paying once their annual income was 240 Pounds, and families would pay if their income was greater than 340. The highest rate would be 75% (!). Corporate tax would be 20%. There would be an emergency tax on fuel. Two separate administrative decisions were made pertaining to the payment of wages of laborers working for the government and of clerks. This seems to reflect an important distinction in the mind of the (mostly socialist) ministers.
The September 1st meeting opened with ministers' queries: Is it true Arab families are being evicted from their homes in Haifa? Is Haifa under military rule? Ben Gurion said not, but Yizhak Grinbaum, the Minister of the Interior, said he'd have go and see for himself. The most puzzling exchange was when Bechor Shitrit asked if Arabs would be able to vote in the approaching elections, and Ben Gurion said this wasn't a legitimate query. (Puzzling because the only possible answer was Yes, according to the Declaration of Independence and also everyone's intentions.)
There was a report about Israel's relations with the United States, and then the cabinet adjourned after deciding that construction of the Burma Road, which broke the Arab blockade of Jerusalem, would be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor and Construction.
September 5, 1948:
Decision: official forms will be in Hebrew and Arabic.
Decision: lots of officials from lots of ministries will participate in meeting of the Board of Agriculture.
On the occasion of the beginning of the school year there appears to have been another lively discussion, at the end of which a series of decisions were made; their thrust was that various strategic decisions regarding how education would be done and its relationship with the government would be postponed until there was an elected government; in the meantime, the government would work with the Jewish Agency (which had been functioning as a government-in-waiting before the creation of the state). Also, the Agudat Yisrael schools would have to choose how their system would relate to the national one. (This issue has yet to be resolved in 2013.)
A ministerial committee of four was set up to allocate empty apartments in Jaffa.
Monday, January 7, 2013
Cabinet Protocols: Mid August 1948
In mid-August 1948, the cabinet slowed down for some reason. In the first few weeks after Israel's creation and in the midst of a bitter war for existence, the cabinet had convened three, sometimes even four times a week. Then for a while there were two regular weekly meetings. In the weeks of August 11 and 18, 1948, however, there was only one weekly meeting each - and even these don't appear to have been particularly dramatic. I don't know the reason for the slackness - clearly, it wasn't because everyone was trooping off for their summer vacations, since there were no fewer participants than usual. We'll have to see as this series progresses if this was a new norm.
The scanned protocols are here.
The meeting of August 18 began with two questions from Rav Maimon (Fishman), Minister of Religious Affairs. The first had to do with taxes, and Ben Gurion shot it down, as he did sometimes, by saying it wasn't a real question. I wish I knew how he decided what were and weren't legitimate questions - clearly, his ministers hadn't yet figured this out. Maimon's second question was about political turf-fighting: was it true the responsibility for the Holy Places had been given to the Ministry of Labor and Construction? Answer: oversight of ancient sites has gone to Construction. (If this sounds like hair-splitting to you, you may be right.)
There was a report about the ongoing UN-led armistice negotiations (no details in the protocol) and a presentation about the currency. There was a vote about what to do with the IZL and Lehi troops, and the cabinet was not in a magnanimous mood: an ultimatum would be issued telling them to join the IDF (thereby losing their own organizational identity) or force would be used against them.
The Minister of Interior, Itzchak Grinbaum, reported on the efforts to register the populace in preparation for holding elections. The cabinet preferred the registration to be authorized by decree rather than the less seemly option of using the Emergency Rules, but no final decision was made.
On August 18, Grinbaum wanted to know why the import of non-kosher meat had been blocked. The Minister of Commerce and Industry replied that he hadn't blocked the import, he had merely halted the negotiations about the import because of public opinion. (See if you can find the difference.)
It was decided that the Minister of Labor and Construction had the authority to requisition private homes to make room for foreign diplomatic delegations. The Minister of Transport was tasked with creating a national airline. There was a discussion about licensing private radio stations, but the only decision made was to forbid an IZL-inspired station.
Finally, touching for the first time on a subject which is still contested in 2013, it was decided that Israeli citizens who are abroad on election day would not be eligible to vote.
The scanned protocols are here.
The meeting of August 18 began with two questions from Rav Maimon (Fishman), Minister of Religious Affairs. The first had to do with taxes, and Ben Gurion shot it down, as he did sometimes, by saying it wasn't a real question. I wish I knew how he decided what were and weren't legitimate questions - clearly, his ministers hadn't yet figured this out. Maimon's second question was about political turf-fighting: was it true the responsibility for the Holy Places had been given to the Ministry of Labor and Construction? Answer: oversight of ancient sites has gone to Construction. (If this sounds like hair-splitting to you, you may be right.)
There was a report about the ongoing UN-led armistice negotiations (no details in the protocol) and a presentation about the currency. There was a vote about what to do with the IZL and Lehi troops, and the cabinet was not in a magnanimous mood: an ultimatum would be issued telling them to join the IDF (thereby losing their own organizational identity) or force would be used against them.
The Minister of Interior, Itzchak Grinbaum, reported on the efforts to register the populace in preparation for holding elections. The cabinet preferred the registration to be authorized by decree rather than the less seemly option of using the Emergency Rules, but no final decision was made.
On August 18, Grinbaum wanted to know why the import of non-kosher meat had been blocked. The Minister of Commerce and Industry replied that he hadn't blocked the import, he had merely halted the negotiations about the import because of public opinion. (See if you can find the difference.)
It was decided that the Minister of Labor and Construction had the authority to requisition private homes to make room for foreign diplomatic delegations. The Minister of Transport was tasked with creating a national airline. There was a discussion about licensing private radio stations, but the only decision made was to forbid an IZL-inspired station.
Finally, touching for the first time on a subject which is still contested in 2013, it was decided that Israeli citizens who are abroad on election day would not be eligible to vote.
Sunday, January 6, 2013
Killing Meir Tobianski
Running a country necessitates difficult decisions. Even in peaceful countries, someone has to make allocations of funds which impact the lives of citizens. In countries at war, leaders must make direct decisions about life and death. Setting up a country, and especially in the midst of war, calls for hard men (and women) who are capable of very hard decisions. Founders of nations will often turn out not to have been the kind of person you'd invite over for tea.
Yet there are degres of hardness. Today's document deals with a small group of hard men who were present at the founding of Israel, indeed, played significant roles in its early years, yet who were too hard, too ruthless, and who crossed lines which shouldn't have been crossed. These were Issar Beeri, Avraham Kraemer (Kidron), Binyamin Gibli, and David Karon. Together, the four of them killed Meir Tobianski on June 30, 1948, as told in today's chilling document.
Meir Tobianski was born in Kovna (now Kaunas) in 1904, and came to Mandatory Palestine in 1925. For most of his adult life, he was affiliated with the Hagana, mostly concurrently with civilian jobs. In 1947, he began working as an engineer in the Jerusalem electricity company. Once the war started he commanded various bases in the Jerusalem area. On June 29, he and his troops swore allegience to the just-created IDF. The next day he traveled down to Tel Aviv on errands.
While in Tel Aviv he was accosted by some officers who summoned him to an urgent meeting. They took him to a building up the road back to Jerusalem and interrogated him, accusing him of transfering sensitive information to the enemy. He admitted giving some information to British colleagues in the electricity company. At this stage, his interrogators declared themselves a military court, sentenced him to death, and had him shot. All on the same day. His body was dumped in a nearby hole. His wife was told his fate only a few days later.
The document drawn up after the event described who Tobianski was, what he admitted, who was on the court, the verdict, the report of execution, and the signatures of the judges, if judges they were, all on one page.
Issar Beeri was tried and discharged from the IDF in February 1949, for the killing of an Arab Israeli called Ali Kassem who had been a Haganah informer suspected of being a double agent. When, a few months later, the newly appointed Attorney General, Yaacov Shimshon Shapira, insisted he be tried for the unlawful killing of Tobianski, there was some resistance since he had already been discharged. Shapira insisted, in an important case demonstrating the supremacy of the rule of law, and Beeri was convicted. He was sentenced to one day in jail but pardoned that same evening by the president. In 1950, he was called to testify in the trial of Paul Kollek (Teddy Kollek's brother) in the case of yet another unlawful wartime killing, of IZL activist Yedidia Segal in 1948. In spite of his crucial achievements in the creation of a military intelligence branch duirng the War of Independance, his violence seems to have ended his career. He died in 1958, age 57.
Beeri's three subordinate officers, who had served as the judges and signed the document, fared better. They were not tried, as it was accepted they had been following Beeri's orders, had assumed they had the authority, and had been convinced of Tobianski's treason.
Avraham Kraemer changed his name to Kidron, and eventually rose to become the General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. David Karon worked for the Mossad, spending years in Teheran. Binyamin Gibli remained in the IDF and rose to become a Colonel in an army which at the time had only two higher ranks; among other positions he was the head of Military Intelligence in the 1950s, where he was probably involved in the 1954 attempt to provoke American and British anger at Egypt by attacking their installations there.
Meir Tobianski was entirely exonerated in 1949. Here is his page on the official website of fallen IDF soldiers. He is buried in the military cemetary on Mount Herzlin Jerusalem.
Yet there are degres of hardness. Today's document deals with a small group of hard men who were present at the founding of Israel, indeed, played significant roles in its early years, yet who were too hard, too ruthless, and who crossed lines which shouldn't have been crossed. These were Issar Beeri, Avraham Kraemer (Kidron), Binyamin Gibli, and David Karon. Together, the four of them killed Meir Tobianski on June 30, 1948, as told in today's chilling document.
Meir Tobianski was born in Kovna (now Kaunas) in 1904, and came to Mandatory Palestine in 1925. For most of his adult life, he was affiliated with the Hagana, mostly concurrently with civilian jobs. In 1947, he began working as an engineer in the Jerusalem electricity company. Once the war started he commanded various bases in the Jerusalem area. On June 29, he and his troops swore allegience to the just-created IDF. The next day he traveled down to Tel Aviv on errands.
While in Tel Aviv he was accosted by some officers who summoned him to an urgent meeting. They took him to a building up the road back to Jerusalem and interrogated him, accusing him of transfering sensitive information to the enemy. He admitted giving some information to British colleagues in the electricity company. At this stage, his interrogators declared themselves a military court, sentenced him to death, and had him shot. All on the same day. His body was dumped in a nearby hole. His wife was told his fate only a few days later.
The document drawn up after the event described who Tobianski was, what he admitted, who was on the court, the verdict, the report of execution, and the signatures of the judges, if judges they were, all on one page.
Issar Beeri was tried and discharged from the IDF in February 1949, for the killing of an Arab Israeli called Ali Kassem who had been a Haganah informer suspected of being a double agent. When, a few months later, the newly appointed Attorney General, Yaacov Shimshon Shapira, insisted he be tried for the unlawful killing of Tobianski, there was some resistance since he had already been discharged. Shapira insisted, in an important case demonstrating the supremacy of the rule of law, and Beeri was convicted. He was sentenced to one day in jail but pardoned that same evening by the president. In 1950, he was called to testify in the trial of Paul Kollek (Teddy Kollek's brother) in the case of yet another unlawful wartime killing, of IZL activist Yedidia Segal in 1948. In spite of his crucial achievements in the creation of a military intelligence branch duirng the War of Independance, his violence seems to have ended his career. He died in 1958, age 57.
Beeri's three subordinate officers, who had served as the judges and signed the document, fared better. They were not tried, as it was accepted they had been following Beeri's orders, had assumed they had the authority, and had been convinced of Tobianski's treason.
Avraham Kraemer changed his name to Kidron, and eventually rose to become the General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. David Karon worked for the Mossad, spending years in Teheran. Binyamin Gibli remained in the IDF and rose to become a Colonel in an army which at the time had only two higher ranks; among other positions he was the head of Military Intelligence in the 1950s, where he was probably involved in the 1954 attempt to provoke American and British anger at Egypt by attacking their installations there.
Meir Tobianski was entirely exonerated in 1949. Here is his page on the official website of fallen IDF soldiers. He is buried in the military cemetary on Mount Herzlin Jerusalem.
Monday, December 31, 2012
Cabinet Protocols, August 4, 1948: Salaries & Languages
Now if we were doing this right, we'd be publishing the protocols of the cabinet like a Swiss watch, once every week. After all, in the summer of 1948 the cabinet was meeting twice each week if not more often. But we haven't been doing it right. Too many other interesting stuff to tell about, and too little time to deal with it all.
But today we're back. Remember, the point of this thread is to follow the protocols of the meetings so as to get a feel for the issues the cabinet dealt with, not to delve into the depths of the minsters' discussions which would take far more time.
On August 4th 1948, almost three months after the founding of the state, the ministers got around to authorizing their own salaries: 175 pounds for the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, 150 for a cabinet minister and a Supreme Court justice.
The Finance Minister presented the matter of supporting families of soldiers (the war was still on, note), and also support for bereaved families. The cabinet accepted that this was the responsibility of the government, and tasked the Ministers of Finance and Security with the creation of a public commission which would decide on guidelines for sums of support.
There was a discussion of identifying external sources for funds.
There were a series of discussions about languages: should there be an official newspaper in a European language? (No). Should the patent office work in English? (Yes, as well. Less than three months into the country's existence and before the end of its first war, the ministers recognized that Israelis would be inventing useful stuff and they needed to be protected. Far-sighted, that.) Might official documents be written in other, non-Hebrew, languages? (Let's decide some other time.)
The 6th of Iyar should probably be Israel's official Independence Day (because independence had been declared on the 4th? Mystifying - and anyway, it didn't happen.)
As a general rule government agencies shouldn't be working on Shabbat, except for operational military needs.
The Hebrew University: 1. Jerusalem must be the cultural and scientific center of Israel. 2. So HU must contiue to operate in Jerusalem. 3. The government will stump up funds. 4. Actually, world Jewry should stump up funds.
But today we're back. Remember, the point of this thread is to follow the protocols of the meetings so as to get a feel for the issues the cabinet dealt with, not to delve into the depths of the minsters' discussions which would take far more time.
On August 4th 1948, almost three months after the founding of the state, the ministers got around to authorizing their own salaries: 175 pounds for the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, 150 for a cabinet minister and a Supreme Court justice.
The Finance Minister presented the matter of supporting families of soldiers (the war was still on, note), and also support for bereaved families. The cabinet accepted that this was the responsibility of the government, and tasked the Ministers of Finance and Security with the creation of a public commission which would decide on guidelines for sums of support.
There was a discussion of identifying external sources for funds.
There were a series of discussions about languages: should there be an official newspaper in a European language? (No). Should the patent office work in English? (Yes, as well. Less than three months into the country's existence and before the end of its first war, the ministers recognized that Israelis would be inventing useful stuff and they needed to be protected. Far-sighted, that.) Might official documents be written in other, non-Hebrew, languages? (Let's decide some other time.)
The 6th of Iyar should probably be Israel's official Independence Day (because independence had been declared on the 4th? Mystifying - and anyway, it didn't happen.)
As a general rule government agencies shouldn't be working on Shabbat, except for operational military needs.
The Hebrew University: 1. Jerusalem must be the cultural and scientific center of Israel. 2. So HU must contiue to operate in Jerusalem. 3. The government will stump up funds. 4. Actually, world Jewry should stump up funds.
Cabinet Protocols, August 8, 1948: Governing Jerusalem
The second weekly cabinet meeting of the week, on August 8th 1948, began with questions from the ministers:
Mordechai Bentov: How many non-Jewish Englishmen are left in Jerusalem? (Ben Gurion: That's not a question for the cabinet.)
Bentov: When can we lift the nightly blackout measures? (BG: Not yet.)
Bentov: Who authorized the destruction of an Arab village? (BG: No-one; we'll investigate.)
Ben Gurion also promised that a department was being formed to deal with matters of abandoned property.
Most of the meeting was spent on political haggling about Jerusalem. It was decided not to hold elections for a city council at this stage, but rather to appoint a council according to the relative political power of the various political parties, including those not represented in the cabinet.
So far so good. But then they had to decide what the relative political strength is, and how to allocate the seats on the council. Although our document is a protocol, not a stenogramn which records every word, the discussion appears to have been prolonged and heated. Even if you don't read Hebrew, have a look at pages 2 and 3 and you'll see the list of political combinations discussed and voted down: for a council with 16 members, or 19, or 21, or 25. It was only once the ministers had allocated their parties 27 seats at the council's table that they managed to reach agreement. (There were 15 cabinet ministers at the time.) These were men who regularly made decisions on matters of life and death, war and peace, economy and postal stamps; yet when it came to Jerusalem's City Council, the only way out of the political impasse they could agree on was to add more members.
Mordechai Bentov: How many non-Jewish Englishmen are left in Jerusalem? (Ben Gurion: That's not a question for the cabinet.)
Bentov: When can we lift the nightly blackout measures? (BG: Not yet.)
Bentov: Who authorized the destruction of an Arab village? (BG: No-one; we'll investigate.)
Ben Gurion also promised that a department was being formed to deal with matters of abandoned property.
Most of the meeting was spent on political haggling about Jerusalem. It was decided not to hold elections for a city council at this stage, but rather to appoint a council according to the relative political power of the various political parties, including those not represented in the cabinet.
So far so good. But then they had to decide what the relative political strength is, and how to allocate the seats on the council. Although our document is a protocol, not a stenogramn which records every word, the discussion appears to have been prolonged and heated. Even if you don't read Hebrew, have a look at pages 2 and 3 and you'll see the list of political combinations discussed and voted down: for a council with 16 members, or 19, or 21, or 25. It was only once the ministers had allocated their parties 27 seats at the council's table that they managed to reach agreement. (There were 15 cabinet ministers at the time.) These were men who regularly made decisions on matters of life and death, war and peace, economy and postal stamps; yet when it came to Jerusalem's City Council, the only way out of the political impasse they could agree on was to add more members.
Thursday, December 13, 2012
Government Protocols, 1948: What's the Source of Authority in Jerusalem?
Here's the next installment in our series following the protocols of the meetings of the cabinet. In this series, we've reached the last week of July 1948, in which there were two meetings, on the 28th of July and the 1st of August.
As is often the case with these protocols, they're frustratingly sparse in detail; for the ambience and interpersonal relations of the cabinet members you've got to read the word-by-word stenograms rather than the summary 2-page protocols. Yet as we've seen, perusing the protocols does offer an incremental understanding of what issues were important enough to command the attention of the top decision-making forum in the country.
In the middle of the fourth month of the country's existence, with the war still not over, much of the attention of the cabinet was focused on the cease-fire negotiations with the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. They didn't much like his proposals, that's clear even from the sparse protocols. Of the three resolutions adopted, two were rejections: No to the proposals for demilitarized zones, and an expression of scepticism as to Bernaddotte's goals regarding Jerusalem, since he was on the record as advocating Arab control of the city. The third resolution, however, left the door open to any resolution which would end violence in the city. (Here's a summary of what Bernadotte thought he was doing.)
Other topics included the question of whether government-employed laborers had worked on shabbat to prepare a ceremony - a perennial theme of Israeli politics from day one.
The second weekly session opened with a novelty: three top economic figures were brought in to report on how the state was setting up its currency. Anyone who has ever had anything to do with cabinet meetings these past few decades will tell you such meetings are populated by the cabinet ministers themselves along with multitudes of aides. This seems not to have been the case in the early years of the state, when apparently the only participants of cabinet meetings were the members of the cabinet. How very odd.
The most important part of the meetings dealt with Jerusalem. It was time for somebody to clarify to the populace in the Israeli-controlled part of town what their legal status was, and how they were related to the State of Israel. A draft proclamation was submitted, and the ministers seem to have debated it very seriously, line by line. At the end they had a formulation which was then attached to the protocol, so you can see it at the link above.
The principles were that David Ben Gurion as the Minister of Defense decreed:
1. That the area of Jerusalem was defined as that controlled by the army on August 2nd 1948 or future changes;
2. Israeli law would apply on that territory;
3. The populace was called upon to obey orders of the military commander in matters of public peace;
4. The declaration would be made public;
5. It would apply retroactively to midnight on May 14th, or to whatever date any particular area had been occupied thereafter.
For an idea how very important this document turned out to be, see the discussions in the cabinet after the Six Day War in 1967, when the Minister of Justice looked back at this document and explained its fundamental significance (we described that discussion here).
As is often the case with these protocols, they're frustratingly sparse in detail; for the ambience and interpersonal relations of the cabinet members you've got to read the word-by-word stenograms rather than the summary 2-page protocols. Yet as we've seen, perusing the protocols does offer an incremental understanding of what issues were important enough to command the attention of the top decision-making forum in the country.
In the middle of the fourth month of the country's existence, with the war still not over, much of the attention of the cabinet was focused on the cease-fire negotiations with the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. They didn't much like his proposals, that's clear even from the sparse protocols. Of the three resolutions adopted, two were rejections: No to the proposals for demilitarized zones, and an expression of scepticism as to Bernaddotte's goals regarding Jerusalem, since he was on the record as advocating Arab control of the city. The third resolution, however, left the door open to any resolution which would end violence in the city. (Here's a summary of what Bernadotte thought he was doing.)
Other topics included the question of whether government-employed laborers had worked on shabbat to prepare a ceremony - a perennial theme of Israeli politics from day one.
The second weekly session opened with a novelty: three top economic figures were brought in to report on how the state was setting up its currency. Anyone who has ever had anything to do with cabinet meetings these past few decades will tell you such meetings are populated by the cabinet ministers themselves along with multitudes of aides. This seems not to have been the case in the early years of the state, when apparently the only participants of cabinet meetings were the members of the cabinet. How very odd.
The most important part of the meetings dealt with Jerusalem. It was time for somebody to clarify to the populace in the Israeli-controlled part of town what their legal status was, and how they were related to the State of Israel. A draft proclamation was submitted, and the ministers seem to have debated it very seriously, line by line. At the end they had a formulation which was then attached to the protocol, so you can see it at the link above.
The principles were that David Ben Gurion as the Minister of Defense decreed:
1. That the area of Jerusalem was defined as that controlled by the army on August 2nd 1948 or future changes;
2. Israeli law would apply on that territory;
3. The populace was called upon to obey orders of the military commander in matters of public peace;
4. The declaration would be made public;
5. It would apply retroactively to midnight on May 14th, or to whatever date any particular area had been occupied thereafter.
For an idea how very important this document turned out to be, see the discussions in the cabinet after the Six Day War in 1967, when the Minister of Justice looked back at this document and explained its fundamental significance (we described that discussion here).
Monday, November 26, 2012
Government Protocols, July 25-28 1948
The cabinet convened twice during the week of July 21, 1948. No meeting since the creation of the state two months earlier had resembled a standard cabinet meeting - assuming there is a standard - and the meetings this week were no exception. The state and its administration were still at war, and also still organizing themselves, and everything the cabinet discussed reflected this. Thus, the first item on the agenda of July 21 was about setting up a committee of five cabinet members to run the war (the topic was ultimately put off for a later meeting). A series of ministers raised various questions about how things were to be run:
Then there was a discussion about the territories taken during the hostilities and their Arab inhabitants. It was decided to appoint a ministerial committee to make particular decisions. In the meantime, however, Arabs who left would not be allowed back, as a general rule with possible exceptions. The Ministry of Finance would manage unclaimed property. An inquiry would be made into the reasons for the departure of the Arab population. The ministerial committee would have the authority to destroy empty villages. A military commander would be appointed to administer the territories.
The meeting then dealt with the ongoing process of moving authority from the Jewish Agency to the government. It was also decided to hold two regular weekly cabinet meetings, one for practical discussions and the other for general discussions. (Good luck with keeping that distinction!)
On the 25th, Aharon Zisling, Minister of Agriculture, wanted to know why the censor had shut down the left-leaning Al Hamishmar newspaper. Ben Gurion explained, but other ministers demanded the subject be urgently discussed at an upcoming meeting. (This was the censor in the Ministry of Defense, in case you were wondering: Ben Gurion was the minister there.)
Most of the meeting focused on Jerusalem. It was determined that a military governor be appointed for the city, but the cabinet would closely follow decisions regarding the city. Ministries were encouraged to set up offices in Jerusalem.
* Why is the IZL (Irgun) still running a radio station? (The Minister of the Interior answered: they didn't ask anyone.)Ben Gurion announced there would soon be a military parade in Tel Aviv.
* Is there an official censor (the Minister of the Interior: there should be one in my ministry but there seems to be one in the Ministry of Defense - to be discussed later.)
* Is it alright that anyone can broadcast without a license? (Interior: Ask the police or justice minister.)
* Shouldn't the Minster of Justice bring a list of judges? (Ben Gurion: that's a statement, not a question.)
Then there was a discussion about the territories taken during the hostilities and their Arab inhabitants. It was decided to appoint a ministerial committee to make particular decisions. In the meantime, however, Arabs who left would not be allowed back, as a general rule with possible exceptions. The Ministry of Finance would manage unclaimed property. An inquiry would be made into the reasons for the departure of the Arab population. The ministerial committee would have the authority to destroy empty villages. A military commander would be appointed to administer the territories.
The meeting then dealt with the ongoing process of moving authority from the Jewish Agency to the government. It was also decided to hold two regular weekly cabinet meetings, one for practical discussions and the other for general discussions. (Good luck with keeping that distinction!)
On the 25th, Aharon Zisling, Minister of Agriculture, wanted to know why the censor had shut down the left-leaning Al Hamishmar newspaper. Ben Gurion explained, but other ministers demanded the subject be urgently discussed at an upcoming meeting. (This was the censor in the Ministry of Defense, in case you were wondering: Ben Gurion was the minister there.)
Most of the meeting focused on Jerusalem. It was determined that a military governor be appointed for the city, but the cabinet would closely follow decisions regarding the city. Ministries were encouraged to set up offices in Jerusalem.
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