Tuesday, October 20, 2015
No Longer a Common Law Wife: Levi Eshkol Signs A Formal Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, 1965
On 25 October we will mark the 120th anniversary of the birth of Levi Eshkol, Israel's third prime minister . Levi Shkolnik, later Eshkol, was born in Oratavo, in Ukraine and came to Palestine in 1914. After serving as the minister of finance for many years, Eshkol became prime minister on 26 June 1963 and served until his death in 1969. Until 1967 he was also minister of defence. One of his most important achievements was the signing of a secret memorandum of understanding with the US on 10 March 1965. This agreement is considered the beginning of the strategic alliance so important to Israel's security and international status.
 |
| Levi Shkolnik in the 1920s, Israel State Archives |
Here we presents a publication showing the background to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and the negotiations which led up to the signing (for the text see below, ISA A/7935). The publication includes 18 documents, some from our holdings specially declassified for the purpose, and some from the US archives, published in Volume XVIII of the Foreign Relations of the United States series on the Johnson Administration
You can see all the Hebrew documents on our Hebrew blog.
Background
In Israel's early years the US gave it support and financial help but there was no alliance between them. The Administration wanted to keep good relations with the Arabs and at first Israel preferred neutrality between East and West in order to receive help from both Great Powers. In 1950 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided to support the West in the Korean War, which enabled Israel to receive more economic aid and surplus outdated weapons. When the Soviets began to arm Egypt, the US preferred France to serve as Israel's main arms supplier.
Under the Kennedy Administration this began to change. Although the Americans made difficulties for Israel with their demands over the nuclear reactor in Dimona and the Palestinian refugee problem, in September 1962 they agreed to sell Israel advanced weapons defined as defensive – Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. One of the reasons for this decision was the Egyptian efforts to develop surface to surface missiles. In December 1962 Kennedy told Foreign Minister Golda Meir that the US had a "special relationship" with Israel like its relationship with Britain, but he refused to formalize this link. At most he agrred to repeat past US declarations and to declare that the US was committed to preserving the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East, including Israel. The Administration feared that a formal alliance would damage its relations with moderate Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and drive the Arabs into the arms of the USSR.
In June 1963 Ben-Gurion resigned and Eshkol replaced him. He managed to reduce the tension with the US over inspection of the nuclear reactor in Dimona. One of the factors which persuaded the Americans was the realization that Egyptian President Nasser did not intend to accept their proposals for a compromise with Israel and that he was undermining Western interests in Yemen and Algeria. On 3 October 1963 Kennedy sent Eshkol a letter on the US stand, emphasizing its friendship for Israel and strong military presence in the Middle East but rejecting Ben-Gurion's proposal for a formal alliance (Document 1, ISA A-7939/3). Eshkol replied on 3 November that the Egyptian threat to Israel's crowded population centres obliged the US to help Israel acquire advanced weapons at a low price (Document 2, ISA A-7939/3).
The Johnson Administration
On 22 November Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, and Lyndon Johnson became president. Johnson's personal attitude to Israel was more positive. In his first letter to Eshkol in January 1964 he repeated Kennedy's stand on the use of the River Jordan waters, the refugee question and the US commitment to Israel, but did not mention Dimona. Eshkol replied, thanking him and expressing his hope to meet the president. Eshkol was in fact invited to visit the White House, and he arrived in June 1964 – the first official visit by an Israeli prime minister.
 |
| Eshkol and Johnson inspect an honour guard at the White House, 1 June 1964 Photograph: Moshe Pridan, Governmet Press Office |
On 18 June Eshkol reported to the government on his visit and spoke very warmly of Johnson: "You feel as if a friend is walking with you on a dark night, and you are not afraid, and neither is he afraid." The two discussed bilateral relations, including the supply of US tanks through West Germany (see Israel's Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, 1961-1965) and building a nuclear reactor for water desalination. Eshkol described Johnson as "full of good will and concern" for Israel's security. Education Minister Zalman Aranne commented that it seemed that for the first time Israel's relations with the US had emerged from the status of a "diplomatic common law wife." (Document 4 in Hebrew). As a result of this talk Israel was able to buy US tanks through Germany, but Johnson refused to sell it planes.
Crisis with West Germany: A Turning Point in Relations with Germany – and with the US
At the beginning of 1965 the sale of US tanks to Israel by West Germany was revealed by the press and this led to a crisis. Up till then Israel and the Federal Republic did not have diplomatic relations, and Germany gave Israel economic aid under the Reparations Agreement of 1952. After the deal was exposed Egypt invited the East German leader Walter Ulbricht to Cairo. In reaction West Germany decided to stop selling arms to "areas of tension", including Israel, and to cancel the sale of tanks, but to establish full diplomatic relations (for the full story, see our publication).
As a result of this crisis two high level delegations from the US came to Israel to discuss security relations. The first arrived on 12 February 1965 and was headed byRobert Komer of the National Security Council (codenamed "Ahiassaf" in the Israeli documents), with Walworth Barbour, the US ambassador and his first secretary, Stephen Palmer. Before he left Komer sent a memorandum to the president discussing how to balance Israeli's demands for arms instead of the tanks from Germany with Jordanian demands, and how to prevent a violent reaction by Nasser. Komer's instructions, delivered on 10 February, were "to explain to the Government of Israel in full and friendly candor the reasons why we believe that limited and carefully spaced out US arms sales to Jordan are far better than the alternative of uncontrollable Soviet or UAR supply." The US was supporting Jordan solely because they saw this as an Israeli interest. They still preferred Israel to receive arms from Europe but recognized that US sales might become necessary.
Sitting on the Israeli side of the table were all the political and security top brass, among them Eshkol, Foreign Minister Meir, Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban, Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres , the Chief of Staff and senior officials. Each side presented its stand and at a lunch meeting in Golda's home on 12 February, the participants held a role playing game in which Golda played the Americans, Eban, the Arabs and Komer represented Israel! However no breakthrough was made. On 24 February a higher ranking delegation arrived headed by Averell Harriman, the ex-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, now a roving ambassador. With Harriman, a veteran Democrat elder statesman, were Komer, Earl Russell, a State Department official, and Barbour. Their aim was to formalize the US commitment to Israel's security. In return Israel would agree not to oppose arms sales to Jordan and an understanding would be reached on the nuclear issue. On the same day Rainer Barzel , one of the leaders of the Christian Democrat party in West Germany, met with Johnson and expressed satisfaction with the Harriman mission.
The US is Trying to Buy a New Cadillac for Ten Bucks: Johnson's Decision to Settle with Israel
The talks with Harriman opened on 25 February and on 28 February Golda Meir told the government that a historic change had taken place: for the first time the US had agreed to become Israel’s main arms supplier (Document 9 in Hebrew). However other accounts describe disagreements, and on 1 March the talks were on the verge of failure (Document 10 in Hebrew). The Americans emphasized the urgency of their answer to Jordan and their fear of its defection to the Soviet-Egyptian camp. If there was no agreement they would abandon Hussein, but Israel would not receive arms either. Due to unwelcome publicity Harriman left for East Asia, and Komer replaced him.
 |
| Nasser and Hussein at the Arab summit in 1964 Photograph: Wikipedia |
On 2 March Golda reported to the government on the problem issues, including US opposition to the introduction of bomber aircraft into the Middle East (Document 11 in Hebrew). On 5 March Barbour reported to Johnson and to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Eshkol had refused the latest proposal. They had insisted on a counter-proposal and thought he was "shaken". On the same day, the Foreign Ministry recalled Ambassador Avraham Harman in Washington to Jerusalem immediately due to dramatic developments. On 6 March Komer wrote to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that only a deal including bombers and tanks would persuade Israel to agree to arms for Jordan. The negotiations had undermined the US bargaining position, and Israel was waiting for a better offer. But it had genuine security concerns, and as Barbour said, the US "was trying [to] buy [a] new Cadillac for ten bucks." Washington decided to leave the difficult issues of the Jordan waters and the nuclear reactor for a later date, and to settle with Israel. According to Mordecai Gazit, the Israeli minister in Washington, this was Johnson’s decision, and he had approved all the moves in the negotiations.
On 10 March, a day after the signing of a secret draft agreement with Germany, Israel and the US signed the MOU. It included a commitment by the US to Israel’s security and Israel’s commitment not to be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The US announced its intention to sell tanks to Jordan and King Hussein’s promise to deploy them on the east bank of the Jordan. The US would sell tanks and fighter planes to Israel on easy terms. It was signed by Eshkol, Komer and Barbour. According to a report by Harriman he was pleased with the results of the talks but warned that the water issue was likely to lead to a clash. He recommended the president not to agree to Eshkol’s request to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Afterwards Eshkol and Johnson exchanged letters.
 |
| An Israel Air Force Skyhawk Photograph: Oren Rozen, Wikipedia |
As a result of the MOU Israel obtained modern weapons, especially tanks which made possible its victory in 1967. It also received Skyhawk planes, which arrived later but played an important part in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
Kennedy, Johnson and Maariv
We're working towards launching a new ISA website later this year. Among other preparations, a group of staff is working on a collection of the Cabinet transcripts from 1948-1967, which we hope to put online in its entirety. As we look at the documents, we'll try to put up some teasers, mostly on our Hebrew language blog; so if you read Hebrew and are interested in the classified discussions in Israel's Cabinet in its early years, feel free to follow us over there.
One of our staff blogged about the Cabinet discussions following Kennedy's assassination in November 1963. The first meeting was characterized by the same shock everyone else was in. A week later, however, on Dec. 1, 1963, Golda Meir reported at length. Golda was the Foreign Minister at the time, and it just so happened that she'd been in the US, and her colleagues were eager to hear her impressions.
Some of what she had to tell was generally known, such as her description of the funeral. Some was tinged by the Jewish Question. Golda and all the Jews she'd been in contact with were apprehensive that the assassin might turn out to have been Jewish: "It may not be rational that we were afraid he would turn out to be Jewish--why should he be Jewish and what difference would it make?--but that's the way it is. We were worried." Then she spoke about all the reasons to suspect there had been some sort of conspiracy, and was of course worried by the fact that Jack Ruby, Oswald's killer, was Jewish.
Then Golda went on to talk about Lyndon Johnson and Israel. She and Johnson knew each other from previous occasions, and once, when as Vice President he had been at some convention of diplomats, he had even invited her to lunch. She was proud to note that at Johnson's first reception after the funeral he had been very friendly to her. She then talked about her brief meeting with him the next day--and here she probably lowered her voice and told the rest of the Cabinet ministers she was about to divulge confidential information which they must keep to themselves. Johnson had told her that not only would he continue Kennedy's friendly policy towards Israel, if anything, he would improve the relations.
"That was in the paper," said Health Minister Shapira.
"It was in the newspaper?" replied Golda
"Yes. In Maariv," said Abba Eban.
"So you see, the leak didn't come from the Cabinet," noted Shapira.
"We've got unfair competition, it seems," concluded Zalman Aran, minister of education.
One of our staff blogged about the Cabinet discussions following Kennedy's assassination in November 1963. The first meeting was characterized by the same shock everyone else was in. A week later, however, on Dec. 1, 1963, Golda Meir reported at length. Golda was the Foreign Minister at the time, and it just so happened that she'd been in the US, and her colleagues were eager to hear her impressions.
Some of what she had to tell was generally known, such as her description of the funeral. Some was tinged by the Jewish Question. Golda and all the Jews she'd been in contact with were apprehensive that the assassin might turn out to have been Jewish: "It may not be rational that we were afraid he would turn out to be Jewish--why should he be Jewish and what difference would it make?--but that's the way it is. We were worried." Then she spoke about all the reasons to suspect there had been some sort of conspiracy, and was of course worried by the fact that Jack Ruby, Oswald's killer, was Jewish.
Then Golda went on to talk about Lyndon Johnson and Israel. She and Johnson knew each other from previous occasions, and once, when as Vice President he had been at some convention of diplomats, he had even invited her to lunch. She was proud to note that at Johnson's first reception after the funeral he had been very friendly to her. She then talked about her brief meeting with him the next day--and here she probably lowered her voice and told the rest of the Cabinet ministers she was about to divulge confidential information which they must keep to themselves. Johnson had told her that not only would he continue Kennedy's friendly policy towards Israel, if anything, he would improve the relations.
"That was in the paper," said Health Minister Shapira.
"It was in the newspaper?" replied Golda
"Yes. In Maariv," said Abba Eban.
"So you see, the leak didn't come from the Cabinet," noted Shapira.
"We've got unfair competition, it seems," concluded Zalman Aran, minister of education.
Sunday, December 28, 2014
How Unique Was Israel Granting Asylum to Political Escapees in South Africa? Very.
Six months ago, we published on the Israel State Archives site and on this blog a collection of documents covering the relations between Israel and South Africa. As noted then, while collecting and researching the different documents, we came upon an interesting letter, sent by the Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Dr. Chaim Yahil. In the letter, Yahil allows the legation in Pretoria to give asylum to political escapees, without prior authorization by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Israel State Archives employs former diplomats from Israel's Foreign Ministry. When we showed them this document, we were told that it is quite extraordinary, since this kind of authorization allowing a fugitive into an Israeli diplomatic mission is unprecedented.
We have found reinforcement of the uniqueness of Yahil's directive in another document, discovered while preparing the next project in our series of publications concerning Israel's relations with Africa during the 60's. In this document, we found that a previous request to provide political asylum in Israeli missions elsewhere had been rejected.
The request was made in a letter written by Israel's consul-general in Lisbon, Levy Alon, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We didn't find the original letter of Alon, but rather the response from his superiors, who categorically rejected his proposal. Because we lack his original request, we aren't entirely sure of Alon's intentions. Did he expect political opponents of the authoritarian government in Portugal to try and escape into the premises of Israel's consulate in Lisbon?
In any case, as we noted above, this letter rejecting Alon's proposal underscores the uniqueness of the relatively free hand given to the legation in South Africa, and the level of political risk Israel took on itself in allowing asylum there.
Here is the translation of the letter:
We have found reinforcement of the uniqueness of Yahil's directive in another document, discovered while preparing the next project in our series of publications concerning Israel's relations with Africa during the 60's. In this document, we found that a previous request to provide political asylum in Israeli missions elsewhere had been rejected.
The request was made in a letter written by Israel's consul-general in Lisbon, Levy Alon, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We didn't find the original letter of Alon, but rather the response from his superiors, who categorically rejected his proposal. Because we lack his original request, we aren't entirely sure of Alon's intentions. Did he expect political opponents of the authoritarian government in Portugal to try and escape into the premises of Israel's consulate in Lisbon?
In any case, as we noted above, this letter rejecting Alon's proposal underscores the uniqueness of the relatively free hand given to the legation in South Africa, and the level of political risk Israel took on itself in allowing asylum there.
Here is the translation of the letter:
Jerusalem, October 15th, 1963
To: Consul-General, Lisbon
From: Deputy Director, West European Division
Subject: [right] of sanctuary in the mission
Your letter no. 103.1/6922 from July 22nd.
We passed the matter for clarification by the [Foreign Ministry's] senior staff, which decided to produce a standing order for Israel's diplomatic missions, in which it is stated that no political asylum should be allowed in any circumstances. This rule applies also to Jews. It is possible that in some extraordinary cases asylum will be permitted, pending on prior approval of the Ministry's senior staff. This is a summary of the order, and you will receive the full and accurate wording in a general circular that will be sent to all missions.
Therefore, your initiative served all [in the ministry].
Yours truly,
Nissim Yaish
Sunday, June 15, 2014
Israel's Relations with South Africa - A New Online Publication of the Israel State Archives
As Archivista noted here two weeks ago, we recently published a collection of documents on the relations between Israel and South Africa. They reveal how Israel's opposition to apartheid dominated the bilateral relations, which became increasingly tense and problematic.
Most of the documents published are in Hebrew, quite naturally. It's interesting to note that in the early years of Israel's diplomatic service, Israeli diplomats corresponded in English, out of habit (correspondence with British officials in British mandated Palestine) or due to their origin (as English speaking officials--the most renown of them was of course Abba Eban, but there were quite a few other high ranking officials such as Michael Comay, who came from South Africa, the British Abe Harman and others).
Here's a translation of one of the documents we published regarding South Africa. It was sent to the Legation in Pretoria by the Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Dr. Chaim Yahil.
Most of the documents published are in Hebrew, quite naturally. It's interesting to note that in the early years of Israel's diplomatic service, Israeli diplomats corresponded in English, out of habit (correspondence with British officials in British mandated Palestine) or due to their origin (as English speaking officials--the most renown of them was of course Abba Eban, but there were quite a few other high ranking officials such as Michael Comay, who came from South Africa, the British Abe Harman and others).
Here's a translation of one of the documents we published regarding South Africa. It was sent to the Legation in Pretoria by the Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, Dr. Chaim Yahil.
31 December 1963
To: Chargé d'Affaires in Pretoria
Consul-General in Johannesburg
From: Director General
Diplomatic asylum
A [Foreign]Ministry "standing order" dealing with giving diplomatic asylum in Israeli diplomatic missions is about to be circulated, in which it is stated that no diplomatic asylum should be given inside delegation grounds, without prior authorization of the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs].
The ministry's directorate has given thought to the special situation that may evolve in South Africa, due to the fact that certain Jews are anti-apartheid activists, and may be hunted down by the [South African] government, and would want to seek asylum with you.
Without fundamentally changing the said standing order, we came to a conclusion that in an extraordinary lifesaving situation [the expression used is "Pikuach Nefesh"] and without any practical possibility to contact the Ministry beforehand, you are allowed to act as you see fit, in accordance with all the serious implications that may derive from your decision. Nevertheless, all possible efforts should be made in contacting the Ministry.
This order is for the Pretoria legation only, not the General Consulate in Johannesburg.
Yours truly,
Dr. Chaim Yahil [Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
 |
| Chaim Yahil (Wikipedia) |
This letter is very important, since it shows the extent that Israel was willing to go in its opposition to South Africa: Granting diplomatic asylum for a political fugitive is a sure way to start a clash with the host government.
The Israel State Archives employs former diplomats from Israel's Foreign Ministry. When we showed them this document, we were told that it's quite extraordinary, since this kind authorization allowing a fugitive in an Israeli diplomatic mission is unheard of and they'd never heard of this kind of directive and authorization in their entire careers.
The Israel State Archives employs former diplomats from Israel's Foreign Ministry. When we showed them this document, we were told that it's quite extraordinary, since this kind authorization allowing a fugitive in an Israeli diplomatic mission is unheard of and they'd never heard of this kind of directive and authorization in their entire careers.
Tuesday, November 19, 2013
Golda Meir: JFK Conspiracy Theorist
The Israel State Archives just published a series of documents commemorating 50 years since President John F. Kennedy's assassination. Half of the documents are in English, but one of the more interesting ones is in Hebrew: the minutes of the Israeli government--and Golda Meir--discussing conspiracy theories as to who killed him.
On December 1, 1963, eight days after the assassination of JFK, Golda Meir (then foreign minister) spoke in Israel's government meeting. She'd just returned from Kennedy's funeral and shared her feelings and thoughts with her colleagues.
Here are some of her words (my translation): "After that [the assassination] happened, there was a feeling that in that moment, the world changed for the Americans--not only for the Americans but the entire world. There was a feeling of personal loss for everyone, and it was not artificial. They say that 2 million people were in the streets in Washington. I haven't seen something like that – complete silence, not a word. It was a cold morning, people stood for hours. It was real mourning – a personal loss."
Then came an interesting conversation about the unsolved mysteries of the assassination--mysteries that plagued the public discussion regarding it and Kennedy's presidency in general: "In my opinion," said Golda, "there are some 'dark corners' that I doubt will be ever be cleared… The fact is there is something strange about the Dallas police. A policeman enters the building [the Texas School Book Depository] to check if everything is all right, a guy [Lee Harvey Oswald] with a package passes. The officer asks him 'what's that?' and the guy answers 'a curtain.' The policeman, instead of checking the package and verifying that it is indeed a curtain, lets him go and when someone says to the policeman 'he works with us,' he doesn’t check it as well."
"Oswald was registered as a Castro man, a communist. He tried to be in Russia, as if they [?] knew that he was in Dallas. Very strange things, but the strangest thing is the Jack Ruby affair. …He was seen on television, Oswald saw him a second before Ruby approached him, and he [Oswald] recoiled and it was obvious that Oswald recognized him [Ruby]. How did Ruby enter there? How does a stranger enter the police building? How does he park his car in the police parking area? Later a policeman said: 'if I would have seen him, I would have chased him away; we know him, he has a police record.' If one policeman identified him, probably others identified him as well. How did he enter?"
"And the American government – they now have an investigation not only into how Kennedy was assassinated, but who is Ruby and why and for what reason did he murder Oswald. A high ranking official told me that the question of whether Ruby did this on his own initiative or in order to silence Oswald is a question of war and peace for us [the US]."
"...If he [Oswald] was an emissary of Castro--if there's a clandestine group of Castro sympathizers that murdered the president, and it's organized in way that they silence the murderer … I would say this is as severe as Kennedy's murder. ...Not only am I not a detective, I don't even like detective stories, but I ask myself--I think that Ruby was someone's emissary..."
The rest of the conversation deals with Vice President Johnson, thrown into the president's seat so abruptly, and his attitude towards Israel, as well as the funeral and Jacqueline Kennedy's noble and brave demeanor that impressed Golda Meir. She also described the answer she received to the telegram of condolence she sent to Secretary of State Dean Rusk (which we published last year) and other matters.
On December 1, 1963, eight days after the assassination of JFK, Golda Meir (then foreign minister) spoke in Israel's government meeting. She'd just returned from Kennedy's funeral and shared her feelings and thoughts with her colleagues.
Here are some of her words (my translation): "After that [the assassination] happened, there was a feeling that in that moment, the world changed for the Americans--not only for the Americans but the entire world. There was a feeling of personal loss for everyone, and it was not artificial. They say that 2 million people were in the streets in Washington. I haven't seen something like that – complete silence, not a word. It was a cold morning, people stood for hours. It was real mourning – a personal loss."
Then came an interesting conversation about the unsolved mysteries of the assassination--mysteries that plagued the public discussion regarding it and Kennedy's presidency in general: "In my opinion," said Golda, "there are some 'dark corners' that I doubt will be ever be cleared… The fact is there is something strange about the Dallas police. A policeman enters the building [the Texas School Book Depository] to check if everything is all right, a guy [Lee Harvey Oswald] with a package passes. The officer asks him 'what's that?' and the guy answers 'a curtain.' The policeman, instead of checking the package and verifying that it is indeed a curtain, lets him go and when someone says to the policeman 'he works with us,' he doesn’t check it as well."
"Oswald was registered as a Castro man, a communist. He tried to be in Russia, as if they [?] knew that he was in Dallas. Very strange things, but the strangest thing is the Jack Ruby affair. …He was seen on television, Oswald saw him a second before Ruby approached him, and he [Oswald] recoiled and it was obvious that Oswald recognized him [Ruby]. How did Ruby enter there? How does a stranger enter the police building? How does he park his car in the police parking area? Later a policeman said: 'if I would have seen him, I would have chased him away; we know him, he has a police record.' If one policeman identified him, probably others identified him as well. How did he enter?"
"And the American government – they now have an investigation not only into how Kennedy was assassinated, but who is Ruby and why and for what reason did he murder Oswald. A high ranking official told me that the question of whether Ruby did this on his own initiative or in order to silence Oswald is a question of war and peace for us [the US]."
"...If he [Oswald] was an emissary of Castro--if there's a clandestine group of Castro sympathizers that murdered the president, and it's organized in way that they silence the murderer … I would say this is as severe as Kennedy's murder. ...Not only am I not a detective, I don't even like detective stories, but I ask myself--I think that Ruby was someone's emissary..."
The rest of the conversation deals with Vice President Johnson, thrown into the president's seat so abruptly, and his attitude towards Israel, as well as the funeral and Jacqueline Kennedy's noble and brave demeanor that impressed Golda Meir. She also described the answer she received to the telegram of condolence she sent to Secretary of State Dean Rusk (which we published last year) and other matters.
 |
| (Wikipedia) |
 |
| (Wikipedia) |
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Ben Gurion's Last Ceremony
Earlier this week we wrote about Ben Gurion's resignation, 50 years ago this week. As sometimes happens with these sort of things, once the publication went up a staffer in a different department remembered something he'd once seen and did a bit of rummaging. Sure enough, he found, and posted, a snippet of a newsreel from BG's last day at work at the Ministry of Defense. One reason often given for his resignation is that at 77 he was old and tired. Which may be true, though he then went on to live another lively and active ten years. Even assuming he was old and tired, however, note how young and energetic he seems in this short film:
Monday, June 17, 2013
50 years since the first woman in space - Valentina Tereshkova
A year ago, we wrote about the first Chinese female space pilot and we wondered what title she would receive: Astronaut, Cosmonaut or Teikonaut (the Chinese version of space pilot). Yesterday, June 16, was the 50 years anniversary of the first woman in space - Valentina Tereshkova.
Here's a congratulatory telegram sent by Foreign Minister Golda Meir to Tereshkova after her historic flight. The cable is interesting because it is written in Russian in Latin characters (the Israeli embassy in Moscow probably converted the telegram to Cyrillic script before delivery to Tereshkova) and because it reflects the commitment of Golda Meir to the advancement of women in the international arena.
 |
| RIA Novosti archive, image #612748 / Alexander Mokletsov / CC-BY-SA 3.0 |
Sunday, June 16, 2013
50 Years Since Ben Gurion's Resignation
David Ben Gurion resigned 50 years ago today, on June 16, 1963. While he had briefly retired to Sdeh Boker in 1954, passing the prime minster's baton to Moshe Sharett, this time he was serious about leaving, as everyone understood. He was 77 years old; he had been the leader of the Yishuv, the State-in-Waiting and the State itself, for more than 40 years. 50 years later, he is still the undisputed greatest leader the Zionist movement has ever called forth, to the extent that even a carefully non-political blog such as this has no hesitation in naming him.
On the anniversary of his departure, the ISA has published a collections of documents surrounding the event (in Hebrew). Here are three of them.
At the time, many people, politicians and ordinary folks alike, feared that his departure would be a blow to what was still a fledgling country. But not everyone. The delegation of the Herut, the largest opposition party, told President Shazar, whosummoned them for consultations before deciding whom to entrust with the task of setting up the next government, that they were glad Ben Gurion was leaving, and they hoped his departure would be good for the country. Two points stand out from their discussion. First, that they addressed the president in the third person, almost as to aristocracy. Hard to imagine that in Israel's political culture now, or anytime in the recent past - but in 1963 the country was still young, leaders still cast at least a semblance of awe, or at least minimal respect. The second point is that they felt Ben Gurion's departure had something to do with the crises surrounding the German rocket scientists employed by Egypt. Some stories never die, they merely fade and then return.
The other two documents are newsreels. The first is narrated in French (no idea why) and tells of Ben Gurion's trip to the United State in 1951; the second is narrated in Arabic (???) and tells of Levy Eshkol's trip to the US in 1964. Ben Gurion's trip was unofficial Eshkol's was official, but the different tone of the two films is probably more fundamental than a matter of protocol. Ben Gurion basked in public adulation; Eshkol came to do business. It's worth watching them even if your language skills aren't sufficient.
On the anniversary of his departure, the ISA has published a collections of documents surrounding the event (in Hebrew). Here are three of them.
At the time, many people, politicians and ordinary folks alike, feared that his departure would be a blow to what was still a fledgling country. But not everyone. The delegation of the Herut, the largest opposition party, told President Shazar, whosummoned them for consultations before deciding whom to entrust with the task of setting up the next government, that they were glad Ben Gurion was leaving, and they hoped his departure would be good for the country. Two points stand out from their discussion. First, that they addressed the president in the third person, almost as to aristocracy. Hard to imagine that in Israel's political culture now, or anytime in the recent past - but in 1963 the country was still young, leaders still cast at least a semblance of awe, or at least minimal respect. The second point is that they felt Ben Gurion's departure had something to do with the crises surrounding the German rocket scientists employed by Egypt. Some stories never die, they merely fade and then return.
The other two documents are newsreels. The first is narrated in French (no idea why) and tells of Ben Gurion's trip to the United State in 1951; the second is narrated in Arabic (???) and tells of Levy Eshkol's trip to the US in 1964. Ben Gurion's trip was unofficial Eshkol's was official, but the different tone of the two films is probably more fundamental than a matter of protocol. Ben Gurion basked in public adulation; Eshkol came to do business. It's worth watching them even if your language skills aren't sufficient.
Monday, December 17, 2012
How Eleanor Roosevelt Became a Political Issue in Israel
Eleanor Roosevelt passed away fifty years ago last month. Some months later, Adlai Stevenson II, the US ambassador to the UN, requested of Zalman Shazar, Israel's President, that Israel strike a commemorative stamp in her honor. Shazar responded positively, and sent the matter on to the Ministry of Postal Services (there was such a thing).
The Postal Minister, Eliahu Sasson, brought the matter to the cabinet on November. 3, 1963. He thought it was a fine idea: true, Shazar hadn't consulted with anyone, but Roosevelt had been a friend of Israel, and according to Stevenson, 26 other countries had already accepted his request--and why not, anyway?
Why not indeed? Because Israel is a complicated little place. As the next speaker, Minister of Welfare Yosef Burg explained:
As such discussions go, it was over quickly (4 pages of stenogram). On the other hand, as such things go, it's doubtful if this was really a matter which should ever have been on the cabinet's agenda.
The Postal Minister, Eliahu Sasson, brought the matter to the cabinet on November. 3, 1963. He thought it was a fine idea: true, Shazar hadn't consulted with anyone, but Roosevelt had been a friend of Israel, and according to Stevenson, 26 other countries had already accepted his request--and why not, anyway?
Why not indeed? Because Israel is a complicated little place. As the next speaker, Minister of Welfare Yosef Burg explained:
1.The president doesn't have the authority to tell us what to do.The rest of the ministers were in favor for many reason's: Roosevelt was worthy, the president's honor, Stevenson's honor, a nice gesture for America's Jews, and so on. Eventually, even Moshe Haim Shapira, Burg's senior colleague from the National Religious Party, agreed that this might be a case for an exception to the rule about not putting faces on stamps, leaving Burg to mutter that Shazar's letter really ought to be looked at.
2. We've decided repeatedly in the past not to commemorate individuals on stamps [for religious reasons, he implies].
3. True, there have been a small number of exceptions, but Stevenson's request wasn't aimed particularly at Israel, and so doesn't justify this being an exception.
4. An American on an Israeli stamp? And what happens when a letter with the stamp gets sent, perhaps, to someone in the Soviet Union?
5. The prime minster should look into the matter. If there's a polite way to refrain, we should.
As such discussions go, it was over quickly (4 pages of stenogram). On the other hand, as such things go, it's doubtful if this was really a matter which should ever have been on the cabinet's agenda.
Monday, July 9, 2012
An Astronaut or Taikunaut? Or Writing a Telegram in Russian in Latin Letters
Almost a month ago, on June 17, the first Chinese woman astronaut was sent into space. But is she an Astronaut or a Taikunaut – a Chinese term for a space traveler ("Taikung" – "space" in Chinese)? The Chinese, it seems, are not so sure. The Chinese launch was almost 49 years after the flight of the first woman in space – the Soviet Cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova. Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister at the time, and always keen on women rights and achievements, sent her a congratulatory telegram. The telegram is rather peculiar – Russian written in Latin letters, due it would seem to the limits of sending telegrams in Russian. You can read it above.
Incidentally, according to one Israeli news site, Israel Post is considering canceling its telegram service for being overly expensive and cumbersome. Sic transit gloria mundi ...
Attempts to bring the Beatles to Israel in the 1960s walked a long and winding road before the Liverpool lads were turned down by the Israeli committee in charge of hosting artists and performers.
Following vociferous public debates that reached as far as the High Court of Justice and the Knesset, the committee ultimately decided to keep the Beatles out of Israel. The band's music, they said, was of "no artistic value," and there was fear their phalanxes of fans might cause a security problem.
To mark 33 years since John Lennon's assassination in New York on December 8, 1980, we've published a number of documents from the Israel State Archives on this dispute. You can see the originals on our Hebrew blog here.
Why were the Beatles kept out of Israel? You could blame it on teen heartthrob and singer Cliff Richard, for one, whose 1963 appearance here had the committee recalling the madness that had accompanied the visit, as it often did on the Fab Four's itinerary, and worrying about a security risk.
Hundreds of crazed Cliff fans had gone to Ben-Gurion Airport to greet him and some even gathered on the tarmac. They welcomed him with screams and yells and the police were unable to keep order. That wild reception contributed to the fear of public disorder if The Beatles were allowed entry.
This, however, was only one of the reasons that the cultural committee--established in the mid-fifties, and tasked with coordinating bringing performers to Israel and evaluating their artistic level, as well as preventing problems during their performances--opposed The Beatles's visit.
The decision was presided over by then-Education Ministry Director-General Yaakov Schneider, father of future left-wing MK and education minister Yossi Sarid.
"There is some kind of fable that my father prevented The Beatles from entering Israel," Sarid said in an interview on Ynet in 2008. "I tried to look into it and didn't find any evidence to support this. I decided, however, that it's a nice legend, so who am I to destroy it?
"I assume that they told my father, who wasn't a great Beatles expert, that the band members have long hair and take drugs, and will surely corrupt Israeli youth."
The committee included representatives from the Education, Finance, and Interior ministries, the Israel Broadcasting Authority and other government bodies. Deputy Education Ministry Director-General Avner Israeli headed it, and their work revolved mostly around the Israeli promoters, or as they were called, "the impresarios."
In January 1964, Israeli promoters Avraham Bugtier and Ya'acov Ori asked the committee for approval to invite The Beatles to perform here.
The committee turned them down on the grounds that it feared the band would have a bad influence on Israeli youth (Document 1). The two appealed the decision in February. A month later, the committee decided not to allow John, Paul, George and Ringo to perform in the Holy Land because the band's music was of no artistic value and its appearances had led to mass hysteria among the youth where they performed. That decision (Document 3) was based on numerous foreign and local newspaper articles about the group and impressions of the Foreign Ministry's Division for Cultural Relations.
It prompted Baruch Gilon, head of the Israeli promoters association, to write a letter of protest to committee chairman Israeli. He accused the committee of overstepping its authority, arguing it had not been authorized to judge the artistic level of any bands. He asked the committee to retract the ban and allow The Beatles to appear, adding that the committee's authority was limited to matters of values and security (Document 3). In response, the Education Ministry's legal adviser wrote that the committee had explicitly been formed -- based on the original letter outlining its responsibilities -- to "ensure the professional level" of performers appearing in Israel.
In August 1964, committee chairman Israeli wrote to the two promoters that even a Washington official dealing with youth had called for banning the group from performing, based on problems that had occurred at their concerts: rioting, mass hysteria (teenage girls screaming, fainting, and massing in places where the group was scheduled to appear), causing injuries and the need for police intervention. No serious promoter should take the risks that accompanied The Beatles concerts, he argued.
In response to a letter of protest (Document 4) from a teenage girl expressing her disappointment over the committee's ban, the Education Ministry spokesman wrote that in this case it was not a matter of the generation gap between the "square" older people and the youth. It was not an attempt to deny them pleasure, the spokesman wrote, but a real fear of negative phenomena which had accompanied the band's appearances elsewhere.
The Beatles debate made it as far as the High Court of Justice. In April 1965, it ruled that the committee indeed had the authority to ban foreign performers and bands from abroad from performing in Israel.
In February 1966, the Beatles issue even rocked the Knesset. MK Uri Avneri posed a parliamentary question to Deputy Education Minister Aharon Yadlin regarding the committee's reasons for not allowing the Beatles to perform in Israel (Document 5). He explained that the band members, who had also become favorites with members of the British establishment, had even received awards from the Queen.
In his response, Yadlin too noted the band's low artistic level. "From an artistic standpoint, this group of singers has no real value," he said, adding that the mass hysteria that broke out when they appeared would require the call-up of many police. He concluded by noting that Beatles performances in other parts of the world ended in brawls, sending some people to the hospital.
The dispute over The Beatles reflects how the band was perceived by the Israeli establishment. The committee, as a representative body of that establishment, expressed in its decision its fear of foreign influence and the undermining of Israeli youth's values.
In the end, however, the Israeli government saw the error of its ways. At a ceremony at The Beatles Museum in Liverpool in January 2008, Israeli Ambassador to the UK Ron Prosor met with John Lennon's sister, Julia Baird, and presented her with an official letter, YNet reported. The letter read: "There is no doubt that it was a great missed opportunity to prevent people like you, who shaped the minds of the generation, to come to Israel and perform before the young generation in Israel who admired you and continues to admire you."
123456
Tuesday, October 20, 2015
No Longer a Common Law Wife: Levi Eshkol Signs A Formal Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, 1965
On 25 October we will mark the 120th anniversary of the birth of Levi Eshkol, Israel's third prime minister . Levi Shkolnik, later Eshkol, was born in Oratavo, in Ukraine and came to Palestine in 1914. After serving as the minister of finance for many years, Eshkol became prime minister on 26 June 1963 and served until his death in 1969. Until 1967 he was also minister of defence. One of his most important achievements was the signing of a secret memorandum of understanding with the US on 10 March 1965. This agreement is considered the beginning of the strategic alliance so important to Israel's security and international status.
|
| Levi Shkolnik in the 1920s, Israel State Archives |
Here we presents a publication showing the background to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and the negotiations which led up to the signing (for the text see below, ISA A/7935). The publication includes 18 documents, some from our holdings specially declassified for the purpose, and some from the US archives, published in Volume XVIII of the Foreign Relations of the United States series on the Johnson Administration
You can see all the Hebrew documents on our Hebrew blog.
Background
In Israel's early years the US gave it support and financial help but there was no alliance between them. The Administration wanted to keep good relations with the Arabs and at first Israel preferred neutrality between East and West in order to receive help from both Great Powers. In 1950 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided to support the West in the Korean War, which enabled Israel to receive more economic aid and surplus outdated weapons. When the Soviets began to arm Egypt, the US preferred France to serve as Israel's main arms supplier.
Under the Kennedy Administration this began to change. Although the Americans made difficulties for Israel with their demands over the nuclear reactor in Dimona and the Palestinian refugee problem, in September 1962 they agreed to sell Israel advanced weapons defined as defensive – Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. One of the reasons for this decision was the Egyptian efforts to develop surface to surface missiles. In December 1962 Kennedy told Foreign Minister Golda Meir that the US had a "special relationship" with Israel like its relationship with Britain, but he refused to formalize this link. At most he agrred to repeat past US declarations and to declare that the US was committed to preserving the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East, including Israel. The Administration feared that a formal alliance would damage its relations with moderate Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and drive the Arabs into the arms of the USSR.
In June 1963 Ben-Gurion resigned and Eshkol replaced him. He managed to reduce the tension with the US over inspection of the nuclear reactor in Dimona. One of the factors which persuaded the Americans was the realization that Egyptian President Nasser did not intend to accept their proposals for a compromise with Israel and that he was undermining Western interests in Yemen and Algeria. On 3 October 1963 Kennedy sent Eshkol a letter on the US stand, emphasizing its friendship for Israel and strong military presence in the Middle East but rejecting Ben-Gurion's proposal for a formal alliance (Document 1, ISA A-7939/3). Eshkol replied on 3 November that the Egyptian threat to Israel's crowded population centres obliged the US to help Israel acquire advanced weapons at a low price (Document 2, ISA A-7939/3).
The Johnson Administration
On 22 November Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, and Lyndon Johnson became president. Johnson's personal attitude to Israel was more positive. In his first letter to Eshkol in January 1964 he repeated Kennedy's stand on the use of the River Jordan waters, the refugee question and the US commitment to Israel, but did not mention Dimona. Eshkol replied, thanking him and expressing his hope to meet the president. Eshkol was in fact invited to visit the White House, and he arrived in June 1964 – the first official visit by an Israeli prime minister.
|
| Eshkol and Johnson inspect an honour guard at the White House, 1 June 1964 Photograph: Moshe Pridan, Governmet Press Office |
On 18 June Eshkol reported to the government on his visit and spoke very warmly of Johnson: "You feel as if a friend is walking with you on a dark night, and you are not afraid, and neither is he afraid." The two discussed bilateral relations, including the supply of US tanks through West Germany (see Israel's Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, 1961-1965) and building a nuclear reactor for water desalination. Eshkol described Johnson as "full of good will and concern" for Israel's security. Education Minister Zalman Aranne commented that it seemed that for the first time Israel's relations with the US had emerged from the status of a "diplomatic common law wife." (Document 4 in Hebrew). As a result of this talk Israel was able to buy US tanks through Germany, but Johnson refused to sell it planes.
Crisis with West Germany: A Turning Point in Relations with Germany – and with the US
At the beginning of 1965 the sale of US tanks to Israel by West Germany was revealed by the press and this led to a crisis. Up till then Israel and the Federal Republic did not have diplomatic relations, and Germany gave Israel economic aid under the Reparations Agreement of 1952. After the deal was exposed Egypt invited the East German leader Walter Ulbricht to Cairo. In reaction West Germany decided to stop selling arms to "areas of tension", including Israel, and to cancel the sale of tanks, but to establish full diplomatic relations (for the full story, see our publication).
As a result of this crisis two high level delegations from the US came to Israel to discuss security relations. The first arrived on 12 February 1965 and was headed byRobert Komer of the National Security Council (codenamed "Ahiassaf" in the Israeli documents), with Walworth Barbour, the US ambassador and his first secretary, Stephen Palmer. Before he left Komer sent a memorandum to the president discussing how to balance Israeli's demands for arms instead of the tanks from Germany with Jordanian demands, and how to prevent a violent reaction by Nasser. Komer's instructions, delivered on 10 February, were "to explain to the Government of Israel in full and friendly candor the reasons why we believe that limited and carefully spaced out US arms sales to Jordan are far better than the alternative of uncontrollable Soviet or UAR supply." The US was supporting Jordan solely because they saw this as an Israeli interest. They still preferred Israel to receive arms from Europe but recognized that US sales might become necessary.
Sitting on the Israeli side of the table were all the political and security top brass, among them Eshkol, Foreign Minister Meir, Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban, Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres , the Chief of Staff and senior officials. Each side presented its stand and at a lunch meeting in Golda's home on 12 February, the participants held a role playing game in which Golda played the Americans, Eban, the Arabs and Komer represented Israel! However no breakthrough was made. On 24 February a higher ranking delegation arrived headed by Averell Harriman, the ex-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, now a roving ambassador. With Harriman, a veteran Democrat elder statesman, were Komer, Earl Russell, a State Department official, and Barbour. Their aim was to formalize the US commitment to Israel's security. In return Israel would agree not to oppose arms sales to Jordan and an understanding would be reached on the nuclear issue. On the same day Rainer Barzel , one of the leaders of the Christian Democrat party in West Germany, met with Johnson and expressed satisfaction with the Harriman mission.
The US is Trying to Buy a New Cadillac for Ten Bucks: Johnson's Decision to Settle with Israel
The talks with Harriman opened on 25 February and on 28 February Golda Meir told the government that a historic change had taken place: for the first time the US had agreed to become Israel’s main arms supplier (Document 9 in Hebrew). However other accounts describe disagreements, and on 1 March the talks were on the verge of failure (Document 10 in Hebrew). The Americans emphasized the urgency of their answer to Jordan and their fear of its defection to the Soviet-Egyptian camp. If there was no agreement they would abandon Hussein, but Israel would not receive arms either. Due to unwelcome publicity Harriman left for East Asia, and Komer replaced him.
|
| Nasser and Hussein at the Arab summit in 1964 Photograph: Wikipedia |
On 2 March Golda reported to the government on the problem issues, including US opposition to the introduction of bomber aircraft into the Middle East (Document 11 in Hebrew). On 5 March Barbour reported to Johnson and to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Eshkol had refused the latest proposal. They had insisted on a counter-proposal and thought he was "shaken". On the same day, the Foreign Ministry recalled Ambassador Avraham Harman in Washington to Jerusalem immediately due to dramatic developments. On 6 March Komer wrote to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that only a deal including bombers and tanks would persuade Israel to agree to arms for Jordan. The negotiations had undermined the US bargaining position, and Israel was waiting for a better offer. But it had genuine security concerns, and as Barbour said, the US "was trying [to] buy [a] new Cadillac for ten bucks." Washington decided to leave the difficult issues of the Jordan waters and the nuclear reactor for a later date, and to settle with Israel. According to Mordecai Gazit, the Israeli minister in Washington, this was Johnson’s decision, and he had approved all the moves in the negotiations.
On 10 March, a day after the signing of a secret draft agreement with Germany, Israel and the US signed the MOU. It included a commitment by the US to Israel’s security and Israel’s commitment not to be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The US announced its intention to sell tanks to Jordan and King Hussein’s promise to deploy them on the east bank of the Jordan. The US would sell tanks and fighter planes to Israel on easy terms. It was signed by Eshkol, Komer and Barbour. According to a report by Harriman he was pleased with the results of the talks but warned that the water issue was likely to lead to a clash. He recommended the president not to agree to Eshkol’s request to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Afterwards Eshkol and Johnson exchanged letters.
|
| An Israel Air Force Skyhawk Photograph: Oren Rozen, Wikipedia |
As a result of the MOU Israel obtained modern weapons, especially tanks which made possible its victory in 1967. It also received Skyhawk planes, which arrived later but played an important part in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
Monday, September 8, 2014
World Literacy Day, 8 September: Israel's Campaign Against Illiteracy, 1964
Today is UNESCO World Literacy Day. To mark the occasion and the 50th anniversary of the first campaign in Israel against illiteracy, the Israel State Archives presents a new publication on adult education on its Hebrew website.
When mass immigration started after the establishment of the state in 1948 , many of the newcomers came from countries with a poor educational system or had missed schooling due to World War II and other upheavals. Although efforts were made to teach them Hebrew, it was often assumed that the first generation was a "lost generation" who would manage as best they could; their children would be educated and know Hebrew well.
In 1961 a second wave of mass immigration began, mainly from North Africa and Romania. In the same year a census was held for the first time since 1948. The census also measured the level of education of Israel's citizens and showed that illiteracy was a serious problem, affecting almost a quarter of a million adults aged 14 and up. Over 162,000 could not read or write at all in any language, two thirds of them women. 96 thousand were semi-literate (defined as those who had attended up to 4 grades of elementary school). At the time there was free compulsory education only up to age 14.Most of the illiterate came from Asia and Africa, but there were also 20,000 illiterate people and 50,00 semi-literate people from Eastern Europe. Illiteracy was also found in the Israeli Arab community, which had lost much of its educated classes when they fled abroad during the war in 1948.
On the initiative of Education Minister Zalman Aranne, it was decided to take action against illiteracy and to teach Hebrew to adults. In January 1964, the "Campaign to Eradicate Illiteracy" was launched, which continued into the 1970s. The first head of the campaign was Yitzhak Navon, then head of the Culture Unit in the Education Ministry and later Israel's fifth president. The participation of women soldiers was organized by Colonel Stella Levy , commander of the Women's Corps of the IDF.
 |
| Yitzhak Navon watches a mother of ten learning to read, 1 May 1964 Photograph: Government Press Office |
The subject of tension between the Mizrachi immigrants (from Asia and Africa) and the old established, mostly Eastern European veteran population, which was in charge of absorbing them, is a sensitive one, even in Israel today. Navon came from an old established Sefardi family from Jerusalem, while Levy was born in Syria. The Campaign to Eradicate Illiteracy is an example of the efforts made as early as the 1960s to help the immigrants to improve their economic situation and social status and to overcome the gap which had opened up between them and their own children.
 |
| Soldier teaching women students in their home. Photograph: IDF Archives |
Women soldiers doing their compulsory service, who volunteered to teach students in remote settlements where illiteracy was very high, played an important part in the programme. The soldiers were given a short preparatory course and further instruction at intervals. The documents in our collection shows that they learned about teaching reading and writing and how to prepare a lesson, but also about the history and culture of the Jews in the Middle East.
The full publication, which includes 30 documents, photographs, films and a map, most of them presented to the public for the first time, will appear over the next few days.
Wednesday, December 11, 2013
Israel Bans the Beatles
 |
| The Beatles in America (Wikipedia) |
Following vociferous public debates that reached as far as the High Court of Justice and the Knesset, the committee ultimately decided to keep the Beatles out of Israel. The band's music, they said, was of "no artistic value," and there was fear their phalanxes of fans might cause a security problem.
To mark 33 years since John Lennon's assassination in New York on December 8, 1980, we've published a number of documents from the Israel State Archives on this dispute. You can see the originals on our Hebrew blog here.
Why were the Beatles kept out of Israel? You could blame it on teen heartthrob and singer Cliff Richard, for one, whose 1963 appearance here had the committee recalling the madness that had accompanied the visit, as it often did on the Fab Four's itinerary, and worrying about a security risk.
Hundreds of crazed Cliff fans had gone to Ben-Gurion Airport to greet him and some even gathered on the tarmac. They welcomed him with screams and yells and the police were unable to keep order. That wild reception contributed to the fear of public disorder if The Beatles were allowed entry.
This, however, was only one of the reasons that the cultural committee--established in the mid-fifties, and tasked with coordinating bringing performers to Israel and evaluating their artistic level, as well as preventing problems during their performances--opposed The Beatles's visit.
The decision was presided over by then-Education Ministry Director-General Yaakov Schneider, father of future left-wing MK and education minister Yossi Sarid.
"There is some kind of fable that my father prevented The Beatles from entering Israel," Sarid said in an interview on Ynet in 2008. "I tried to look into it and didn't find any evidence to support this. I decided, however, that it's a nice legend, so who am I to destroy it?
"I assume that they told my father, who wasn't a great Beatles expert, that the band members have long hair and take drugs, and will surely corrupt Israeli youth."
The committee included representatives from the Education, Finance, and Interior ministries, the Israel Broadcasting Authority and other government bodies. Deputy Education Ministry Director-General Avner Israeli headed it, and their work revolved mostly around the Israeli promoters, or as they were called, "the impresarios."
In January 1964, Israeli promoters Avraham Bugtier and Ya'acov Ori asked the committee for approval to invite The Beatles to perform here.
The committee turned them down on the grounds that it feared the band would have a bad influence on Israeli youth (Document 1). The two appealed the decision in February. A month later, the committee decided not to allow John, Paul, George and Ringo to perform in the Holy Land because the band's music was of no artistic value and its appearances had led to mass hysteria among the youth where they performed. That decision (Document 3) was based on numerous foreign and local newspaper articles about the group and impressions of the Foreign Ministry's Division for Cultural Relations.
It prompted Baruch Gilon, head of the Israeli promoters association, to write a letter of protest to committee chairman Israeli. He accused the committee of overstepping its authority, arguing it had not been authorized to judge the artistic level of any bands. He asked the committee to retract the ban and allow The Beatles to appear, adding that the committee's authority was limited to matters of values and security (Document 3). In response, the Education Ministry's legal adviser wrote that the committee had explicitly been formed -- based on the original letter outlining its responsibilities -- to "ensure the professional level" of performers appearing in Israel.
In August 1964, committee chairman Israeli wrote to the two promoters that even a Washington official dealing with youth had called for banning the group from performing, based on problems that had occurred at their concerts: rioting, mass hysteria (teenage girls screaming, fainting, and massing in places where the group was scheduled to appear), causing injuries and the need for police intervention. No serious promoter should take the risks that accompanied The Beatles concerts, he argued.
In response to a letter of protest (Document 4) from a teenage girl expressing her disappointment over the committee's ban, the Education Ministry spokesman wrote that in this case it was not a matter of the generation gap between the "square" older people and the youth. It was not an attempt to deny them pleasure, the spokesman wrote, but a real fear of negative phenomena which had accompanied the band's appearances elsewhere.
The Beatles debate made it as far as the High Court of Justice. In April 1965, it ruled that the committee indeed had the authority to ban foreign performers and bands from abroad from performing in Israel.
In February 1966, the Beatles issue even rocked the Knesset. MK Uri Avneri posed a parliamentary question to Deputy Education Minister Aharon Yadlin regarding the committee's reasons for not allowing the Beatles to perform in Israel (Document 5). He explained that the band members, who had also become favorites with members of the British establishment, had even received awards from the Queen.
In his response, Yadlin too noted the band's low artistic level. "From an artistic standpoint, this group of singers has no real value," he said, adding that the mass hysteria that broke out when they appeared would require the call-up of many police. He concluded by noting that Beatles performances in other parts of the world ended in brawls, sending some people to the hospital.
The dispute over The Beatles reflects how the band was perceived by the Israeli establishment. The committee, as a representative body of that establishment, expressed in its decision its fear of foreign influence and the undermining of Israeli youth's values.
In the end, however, the Israeli government saw the error of its ways. At a ceremony at The Beatles Museum in Liverpool in January 2008, Israeli Ambassador to the UK Ron Prosor met with John Lennon's sister, Julia Baird, and presented her with an official letter, YNet reported. The letter read: "There is no doubt that it was a great missed opportunity to prevent people like you, who shaped the minds of the generation, to come to Israel and perform before the young generation in Israel who admired you and continues to admire you."
Tuesday, December 10, 2013
Israel and Nelson Mandela, 1962 -1965: A Call for Freedom
Following the passing of Nelson Mandela, the Israel State Archives posted apublication documenting the effort Israel made to prevent the execution of Nelson Mandela and his comrades in 1964. These individuals were tried for different charges, including forming a terrorist organization and training for terrorist acts. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, led by Golda Meir, initiated a joint manifesto by philosopher Martin Buber and writer Chaim Hazaz, calling for the release of the defendants and ending apartheid in South Africa.
This publication is the forerunner of a wider publication--part of a series on Israel's foreign relations--on Israel's relations with South Africa during the 1960s, which will be published on the archives' web site in the coming weeks.
The importance of the publication on Mandela (and the larger publications following it) is challenging the mistaken and often malicious claim that Israel supported South Africa's apartheid regime. Israel did not sympathize with apartheid and did not support it. Israel expressed its opposition to the racial discrimination in South Africa and voted against it in the UN. Israel had contacts with the African National Congress (ANC), and invited its exiled leader, Oliver Tambo, to visit Israel in 1964. Israel, as will be revealed in the documents soon to be published, recalled its Legate from South Africa (Israel didn't have an embassy in South Africa but held a legation) at the end of 1963, and replaced him with a Chargé d'Affaires until the 1970s. All this was done in accordance with UN Resolution 1761, which called all states in the UN to break off their relations with South Africa. Israel didn't completely end relations with South Africa out of consideration for the large and important Jewish community there.
The relations between Israel and South Africa began to warm after the Yom Kippur War. Other African states, in which Israel invested money, manpower and goodwill, broke off relations with Israel en masse during and after the war (several, especially Uganda, broke off relations already in 1972). In reaction, Israel improved its diplomatic, economic and even military relations with South Africa. Nevertheless, Israel continued opposing apartheid, but not as intensively as she did during the 60s. More on this to come.
This publication is the forerunner of a wider publication--part of a series on Israel's foreign relations--on Israel's relations with South Africa during the 1960s, which will be published on the archives' web site in the coming weeks.
The importance of the publication on Mandela (and the larger publications following it) is challenging the mistaken and often malicious claim that Israel supported South Africa's apartheid regime. Israel did not sympathize with apartheid and did not support it. Israel expressed its opposition to the racial discrimination in South Africa and voted against it in the UN. Israel had contacts with the African National Congress (ANC), and invited its exiled leader, Oliver Tambo, to visit Israel in 1964. Israel, as will be revealed in the documents soon to be published, recalled its Legate from South Africa (Israel didn't have an embassy in South Africa but held a legation) at the end of 1963, and replaced him with a Chargé d'Affaires until the 1970s. All this was done in accordance with UN Resolution 1761, which called all states in the UN to break off their relations with South Africa. Israel didn't completely end relations with South Africa out of consideration for the large and important Jewish community there.
The relations between Israel and South Africa began to warm after the Yom Kippur War. Other African states, in which Israel invested money, manpower and goodwill, broke off relations with Israel en masse during and after the war (several, especially Uganda, broke off relations already in 1972). In reaction, Israel improved its diplomatic, economic and even military relations with South Africa. Nevertheless, Israel continued opposing apartheid, but not as intensively as she did during the 60s. More on this to come.
 |
| (Wikipedia) |
Sunday, June 16, 2013
50 Years Since Ben Gurion's Resignation
David Ben Gurion resigned 50 years ago today, on June 16, 1963. While he had briefly retired to Sdeh Boker in 1954, passing the prime minster's baton to Moshe Sharett, this time he was serious about leaving, as everyone understood. He was 77 years old; he had been the leader of the Yishuv, the State-in-Waiting and the State itself, for more than 40 years. 50 years later, he is still the undisputed greatest leader the Zionist movement has ever called forth, to the extent that even a carefully non-political blog such as this has no hesitation in naming him.
On the anniversary of his departure, the ISA has published a collections of documents surrounding the event (in Hebrew). Here are three of them.
At the time, many people, politicians and ordinary folks alike, feared that his departure would be a blow to what was still a fledgling country. But not everyone. The delegation of the Herut, the largest opposition party, told President Shazar, whosummoned them for consultations before deciding whom to entrust with the task of setting up the next government, that they were glad Ben Gurion was leaving, and they hoped his departure would be good for the country. Two points stand out from their discussion. First, that they addressed the president in the third person, almost as to aristocracy. Hard to imagine that in Israel's political culture now, or anytime in the recent past - but in 1963 the country was still young, leaders still cast at least a semblance of awe, or at least minimal respect. The second point is that they felt Ben Gurion's departure had something to do with the crises surrounding the German rocket scientists employed by Egypt. Some stories never die, they merely fade and then return.
The other two documents are newsreels. The first is narrated in French (no idea why) and tells of Ben Gurion's trip to the United State in 1951; the second is narrated in Arabic (???) and tells of Levy Eshkol's trip to the US in 1964. Ben Gurion's trip was unofficial Eshkol's was official, but the different tone of the two films is probably more fundamental than a matter of protocol. Ben Gurion basked in public adulation; Eshkol came to do business. It's worth watching them even if your language skills aren't sufficient.
On the anniversary of his departure, the ISA has published a collections of documents surrounding the event (in Hebrew). Here are three of them.
At the time, many people, politicians and ordinary folks alike, feared that his departure would be a blow to what was still a fledgling country. But not everyone. The delegation of the Herut, the largest opposition party, told President Shazar, whosummoned them for consultations before deciding whom to entrust with the task of setting up the next government, that they were glad Ben Gurion was leaving, and they hoped his departure would be good for the country. Two points stand out from their discussion. First, that they addressed the president in the third person, almost as to aristocracy. Hard to imagine that in Israel's political culture now, or anytime in the recent past - but in 1963 the country was still young, leaders still cast at least a semblance of awe, or at least minimal respect. The second point is that they felt Ben Gurion's departure had something to do with the crises surrounding the German rocket scientists employed by Egypt. Some stories never die, they merely fade and then return.
The other two documents are newsreels. The first is narrated in French (no idea why) and tells of Ben Gurion's trip to the United State in 1951; the second is narrated in Arabic (???) and tells of Levy Eshkol's trip to the US in 1964. Ben Gurion's trip was unofficial Eshkol's was official, but the different tone of the two films is probably more fundamental than a matter of protocol. Ben Gurion basked in public adulation; Eshkol came to do business. It's worth watching them even if your language skills aren't sufficient.
Hi there, I discovered your blog per Google bit searching for such kinda educational advise moreover your inform beholds very remarkable for me. generic anchor text
ReplyDeleteI can give you the address Here you will learn how to do it correctly. Read and write something good. https://www.paulmankin.com/
ReplyDelete